1. Peter Molnar: Would you characterize some speech as“hate speech,” and do you think that it is possible toprovide a reliable legal definition of “hatespeech”?

2. Keenan Malik: I am not sure that “hatespeech” is a particularly useful concept. Much is said andwritten, of course, that is designed to promote hatred. But it makeslittle sense to lump it all together in a single category, especiallywhen hatred is such a contested concept.

In a sense, hate speech restriction has become a means not of addressingspecific issues about intimidation or incitement, but of enforcing generalsocial regulation. This is why if you look at hate speech laws across theworld, there is no consistency about what constitutes hate speech. Britainbans abusive, insulting, and threatening speech. Denmark and Canada banspeech that is insulting and degrading. India and Israel ban speech thathurts religious feelings and incites racial and religious hatred. InHolland, it is a criminal offense deliberately to insult a particular group.Australia prohibits speech that offends, insults, humiliates, or intimidatesindividuals or groups. Germany bans speech that violates the dignity of, ormaliciously degrades or defames, a group. And so on. In each case, the lawdefines hate speech in a different way.

One response might be to say: Let us define hate speech much more tightly. I think, however, that the problem runs much deeper. Hate speech restriction is a means not of tackling bigotry but of rebranding certain, often obnoxious, ideas or arguments as immoral. It is a way of making certain ideas illegitimate without bothering politically to challenge them. And that is dangerous.