Today supermajority rules are thought to solve the core problems of majority decision making – to mitigate the risks associated with majority rule. Yet as the first half of this book has shown, supermajority rule emerged as a means of addressing different problems and reducing the distinctive risks generated by unanimity requirements. The primary liability of unanimity rule was the possibility that one erroneous or self-interested member could derail a decision. Unanimity rule could not accommodate human fallibility and had a high likelihood of generating coercion. Problems with unanimity arose in religious and political contexts alike: unanimity might subject the community to the whims of one erroneous or ill-intentioned member; the true pope or the general will might be misidentified; dissension might elicit coercion on the part of the rest. Supermajority rule reduced these risks, but majority rule did so as well. The benefit of supermajority rule compared to majority rule, according to Rousseau and Condorcet in particular, is that supermajority rule attractively biases our judgment in certain restrictive contexts: toward innocence rather than guilt, or toward the preservation of liberty. In cases where there was a grave risk of erroneous decision – in false conviction, or in disabling sovereign power – a supermajority rule could be valuable.