The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) also spent its formative years debating whether it was even going to perform the functions of a conventional political party. From the beginning, disagreement existed over whether the “party” prioritized the electoral route to power, or whether ideological purity and moral righteousness demanded that the “party” labor primarily as a social movement above the electoral fray, refusing to legitimize PRI-state elections with their participation. The moderates' lack of defined objectives forced the party to bow to the antiregime “movement side” agenda that routinely called for segunda vuelta postelectoral mobilizations as lighting rods for antiregime sentiment. These groups were often at odds, as the “party side” struggled to compete electorally, but without sufficient resources or internal support from the “movement side,” which was always more visible and expedient. The consolidation of the party into a (more or less) unified body committed to facilitating Mexico's democratic transition from within the existing electoral system is traceable only to 1995. The miserable failure of the party's previous strategy of electoral fatalism, that is, the a priori recognition that the party would receive its electoral merits only through the segunda vuelta (and not even through the elections themselves), led to an inevitable reassessment after a string of poor electoral performances in the early 1990s.