Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Modular Arithmetic
- 3 The Addition Cypher, an Insecure Block Cypher
- 4 Functions
- 5 Probability Theory
- 6 Perfect Secrecy and Perfectly Secure Cryptosystems
- 7 Number Theory
- 8 Euclid's Algorithm
- 9 Some Uses of Perfect Secrecy
- 10 Computational Problems, Easy and Hard
- 11 Modular Exponentiation, Modular Logarithm, and One-Way Functions
- 12 Diffie and Hellman's Exponential-Key-Agreement Protocol
- 13 Computationally Secure Single-Key Cryptosystems
- 14 Public-Key Cryptosystems and Digital Signatures
- Further Reading
- Index
12 - Diffie and Hellman's Exponential-Key-Agreement Protocol
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Modular Arithmetic
- 3 The Addition Cypher, an Insecure Block Cypher
- 4 Functions
- 5 Probability Theory
- 6 Perfect Secrecy and Perfectly Secure Cryptosystems
- 7 Number Theory
- 8 Euclid's Algorithm
- 9 Some Uses of Perfect Secrecy
- 10 Computational Problems, Easy and Hard
- 11 Modular Exponentiation, Modular Logarithm, and One-Way Functions
- 12 Diffie and Hellman's Exponential-Key-Agreement Protocol
- 13 Computationally Secure Single-Key Cryptosystems
- 14 Public-Key Cryptosystems and Digital Signatures
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
Motivation
One of the difficulties with traditional, symmetric-key cryptosystems is in getting the two parties to both know a secret key without anybody else knowing. This is particularly difficult when the two parties have never met in person and can only communicate via an insecure channel such as the Internet.
One could try to forestall the above difficulty by providing keys to everybody in advance. However, this introduces another difficulty. Suppose that there are a million and one people that want to participate. We can't know in advance who's going to want to communicate private with whom, so we have to provide each person a million keys, one for each of the other people with whom she might want to communicate. I couldn't possibly remember all these keys, so I have to store them on my computer. Suppose Eve has been eavesdropping on my communication and storing all the messages. If she manages to break into my computer and learn my keys, she can decrypt all these messages.
Worse yet, suppose another person comes along and wants to join the crowd. In order that the new person be able to communicate with everyone else, we have to provide a new key to each of the people already in the crowd. How can we transmit these new keys securely to all these people?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Cryptography PrimerSecrets and Promises, pp. 143 - 146Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014