In thinking about the congressional power to declare war in its historical context, one has to come to terms with the modal verbs “can,” “ought,” and “will.” The previous chapter dealt with “can.” It recalled the enduring precedents set by President Madison and Speaker Clay. These precedents established that, yes, the Congress can declare war, but it cannot decide the question of war and peace. Or, more precisely, it “can” declare war, but only in the minimally technical sense of speaking as the president’s town crier. The next chapter deals with “will.” It discusses the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which codifies the 1812 precedents. Nominally, the resolution authorizes the president to wage war on his own authority for only sixty days, but, in reality, the statutory authorization is open-ended. Once the war has begun, all the Congress can do is whine and appropriate the needed funds. As a result, the resolution makes it virtually impossible to imagine that the Congress will ever again declare war, even in the minimalist sense of acting as the president’s town crier. This chapter deals with “ought.” It tells the troubling story of how the Fifty-fifth Congress both decided, in a manner of speaking, and declared war against Spain over Cuba in April 1898.

In 1898, for the first and only time in American history, a jingoistic yellow press and the Fifty-fifth Congress ardently wanted war. Standing athwart this popular cry were Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, who both opposed war with Spain. The situation was literally unprecedented. President Madison had developed procedures to allow a dictatorial president to impose his will to war upon an indifferent or reluctant Congress. Obviously, the Madisonian precedents were irrelevant in a situation where the president wanted to prevent a war, not to initiate one.