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5 - Moral scientists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 August 2009

Richard Yeo
Affiliation:
Griffith University, Queensland
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Summary

I never heard of any mathematician who was a sceptic in astronomy or physics; and yet, there are few branches of knowledge which lie more open to metaphysical quibbles.

Dugald Stewart (1854–60) [1827], III, 207

Dined with Whewell to meet Arago … [who] told us anecdotes of Laplace … [including one about his dismissal of any hypothesis of a Deity]. LaPlace called on Arago begging him to omit this anecdote as the phrase might do him hurt, he wd not however deny it.

Romilly's Cambridge Diary, Friday 26 September 1834, Bury 1967, 61

One mark of the consolidation which had taken place in the status of science during the nineteenth century was the ability of Francis Galton to single out English men of science as a distinctive group for psychological study. In 1874 Galton inquired into the nature and nurture of this group and felt reasonably confident that he had isolated a significant cluster of attitudes and aptitudes common to such individuals. He did not, however, ‘attempt to define a “scientific man”’ since, as he said, such groups always blend into others. Thus the traces of the earlier problematic profile of men of science remained: Galton remarked, for example, that: ‘Some of my readers may feel surprise that so many as 300 persons are to be found in the United Kingdom who deserve the title of scientific men’ (Galton 1874, 6–7).

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Defining Science
William Whewell, Natural Knowledge and Public Debate in Early Victorian Britain
, pp. 116 - 144
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

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  • Moral scientists
  • Richard Yeo, Griffith University, Queensland
  • Book: Defining Science
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521515.006
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  • Moral scientists
  • Richard Yeo, Griffith University, Queensland
  • Book: Defining Science
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521515.006
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Moral scientists
  • Richard Yeo, Griffith University, Queensland
  • Book: Defining Science
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521515.006
Available formats
×