Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  • Cited by 733
    • Show more authors
    • You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Select format
    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      05 June 2012
      02 September 2002
      ISBN:
      9780511804915
      9780521817448
      9780521520706
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.62kg, 304 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.42kg, 304 Pages
    You may already have access via personal or institutional login
  • Selected: Digital
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org

    Book description

    The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.

    Reviews

    ‘This is a remarkable book. It is embedded firmly in the well-established ‘new institutionalist’ literature on comparative politics. And it extends a well-recognized debate over how (and how carefully) elected politicians delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats. Yet, for all its pedigree, it is original, innovative, and important. It is bold in its theoretical scope, impressive for its painstaking attention to empirical detail, and, for all that, a pleasure to read … This will be the most important book in delegation since Kiewiet and McCubbins’s The Logic of Delegation a decade ago.’

    Source: Japanese Journal of Political Science

    ‘… this is an outstanding book that should be read by anyone interested in legislative-bureaucratic relations.’

    West European Politics

    '… remarkable … This book asks a very crucial, yet little examined question …'.

    Source: Journal of Public Policy

    Refine List

    Actions for selected content:

    Select all | Deselect all
    • View selected items
    • Export citations
    • Download PDF (zip)
    • Save to Kindle
    • Save to Dropbox
    • Save to Google Drive

    Save Search

    You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

    Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
    ×

    Contents

    Metrics

    Altmetric attention score

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.