In his 1775 Speech on the Conciliation of America, British statesman Edmund Burke spoke of Britain's “wise and salutary neglect” of the American colonies. This neglect, he argued – this independence from “the constraint of watchful and suspicious government” – translated into a great deal of freedom from outside interference and allowed the colonies to flourish by adapting their laws to their own needs and priorities. While this development was cast in a positive light by Burke, the negative repercussions for Britain soon became clear, as the wise and salutary neglect led to successful revolt by the colonists. Instead of wisely serving British interests, neglect redounded to their detriment.

This book considers the potential for wise and salutary neglect, but in an entirely different domain. Rather than examining the relationship between nations and their colonies, we explore the relationship between legislatures and their bureaucracies in modern democratic systems. Just as Britain's neglect allowed the colonies to develop their own set of laws, legislatures can allow bureaucrats considerable discretion to draw on their experience and expertise to shape policy outcomes. At the same time, however, allowing bureaucrats considerable autonomy can come back to haunt legislators, much as neglect of the American colonies came back to haunt the British. The problem is that bureaucrats can take actions that run counter to the interests of the legislature.

Our goal is to understand the role of laws in shaping bureaucratic autonomy. At times, legislatures adopt extremely detailed laws in an effort to micromanage the policymaking processes.