Arendt's critique of absolute beginnings is both ingenious and extremely suggestive in clarifying the perplexities of a pure theory of political foundings. It is not itself, however, free from its own ambiguities. She acknowledged that the problem of arbitrariness is not exclusively confined to total breaks. This problem haunts all extraordinary politics, “because beginning's very nature is to carry in itself an element of complete arbitrariness.” Freedom's futile character, what she called “the abyss of freedom,” is inscribed in the very nature of the act to constitute. Even if one dispenses with the eschatological myth of a full rupture, one is still confronted with the unavoidable arbitrariness inherent in all extraordinary projects. Freedom, for Arendt, has its own perils: “The frightening arbitrariness with which we are confronted whenever we decide to embark upon this type of action, which is the exact counterpart of consistent logical processes, is more obvious in the political than in the natural realm.”

This means that extraordinary politics – absolute or relative – not only is arbitrary, boundless, and unpredictable; it is also deeply unstable and fragile. As she admitted, “the capacity to act is the most dangerous of all human abilities and possibilities.” Even if we dispense with the theological fantasy of an eschatological break, we are still confronted with the problem of arbitrariness. Free action can have perverse effects because it is by definition groundless and indeterminate.