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  3. Deontology
  • Cited by 5
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
January 2023
Print publication year:
2023
Online ISBN:
9781108581196
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581196
Series:
Elements in Ethics
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Deontology is a theory about how we should act, morally speaking. It comes in several varieties, but all share certain doctrines, many of which are close to those found in the so-called 'common-sense morality' of the Western world. And all varieties are united in their opposition to consequentialism, a theory that, in its simplest form, tells us that we should always act so as to maximize impersonal value by bringing about the best consequences. This Element presents some of the different versions of deontology, including the views of W. D. Ross, and, to a lesser extent, Immanuel Kant. It defends certain deontological tenets, while challenging others, and contrasts them with consequentialism. Deontology and consequentialism are two of the main contenders in ethical theory, but virtue ethics is another, and it too is addressed (briefly), with an attempt to see it, in its most plausible form, as part of deontology.

References

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