The tragic events of 11 September 2001 challenged traditional conceptions of deterrence. Notwithstanding the immense retaliatory capabilities of the United States, an adversary was willing to attack and face the consequences. This was likely because an organization such as Al Qaeda is decentralized, and so is relatively insulated against US reprisals. As President Bush remarked in a speech at West Point in June 2002, “Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” It may seem somewhat puzzling, then, to broaden the crisis of confidence in deterrence to include so-called “rogue” states that do have a nation and citizens to defend. Justification for such an extension would generally only arise if leaders of rogue states were extreme risk-takers or confident that they could assist terrorists without being discovered. Bush continued, “Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.” In such circumstances, according to the September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the United States should consider pursuing offensive means to defeat the threat: