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Chapter 4 - Attachment Theory

The Rise of Meaning in Psychology

from Part I - The Beginnings of Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2025

L. Alan Sroufe
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota

Summary

Attachment theory offered a solution to a long-term problem in developmental psychology; namely, the lack of evidence for stability in behavior from infancy to later life. What turned out to be essential was to focus on the emotional quality of early relationships. “Security,” or confidence in the availability and responsiveness of caregivers, is what predicted later functioning. Such “trust” becomes the core for building an organized system of meaning. Assessing the history of responsiveness, the quality of the attachment, and later child and adult outcomes, all hinge on attending to the meaning of behavior. None of this works without that. This work leads to a new understanding of how human development is organized.

Information

Type
Chapter
Information
The Development and Organization of Meaning
How Individual Worldviews Develop in Relationships
, pp. 35 - 49
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

Chapter 4 Attachment Theory The Rise of Meaning in Psychology

Before the advent of attachment theory, developmental psychology had been in a rather sterile period. All behavior was thought to be the result of simple associative learning or else built up bit by bit through reinforcement of discrete actions. It had even been argued that there was no such thing as personality because people behaved in different ways in different situations (due to varying situational cues and reinforcement contingencies) – so no consistency, no personality. The child’s tie to the mother was explained as being due to her association with feeding. And individual “attachment” behaviors (smiling, vocalizing, proximity seeking) were viewed as simply gradually built up through reinforcement by parents. Emotions were explained similarly. If children are frequently angry, then this anger must have been rewarded. There was really no search for the coherent, feeling, thinking person. Such a search was deemed fruitless. Meaning had no place.

There is no need for us to consider extensively the illogic and many flaws in these historical positions. Of course people behave differently in different situations. To behave the same way in all situations would be incoherent. And because individuals are coherent there is individual patterning to these variations across situations, as Will Fleeson (Reference Fleeson2001) has shown. As we will discuss in later chapters, one of the key markers of emotional health is the ability to flexibly adjust behavior to the demands and opportunities presented by different situations.

Simple reinforcement is not an adequate account of behavior, though it is the way many specific actions are learned and how, once learned, many specific behaviors are maintained. Reinforcement is powerful, but it does not account for development. Harlow’s famous studies with surrogate-raised rhesus monkeys showed that these infants preferred a cloth “mother” they could hug rather than the wire “mother” that fed them. This preference is not well explained by reinforcement. Further, many studies showed that emotions emerge and are expressed without any major role for reinforcement. As presented in Chapter 2, young infants smiled at the toy clown simply after being exposed to it several times, and then stopped smiling after a few more exposures. This is impossible to explain by reinforcement. It is explained because this event acquired meaning through the infant’s effort to make sense of it.

Mid-twentieth century paradigms were inadequate for understanding how and why individuals develop the worldviews they do; how a personal network of meanings is formed. Developmental psychology needed a radically different approach. Attachment theory was just that. It was a developmental theory rooted in biology, in which meaning had a central place. Likewise, the methods and research carried out to implement this theory also had meaning at their core.

In this new perspective, attachment is a unique biological system, independent of feeding. As psychoanalyst and scholar John Bowlby pointed out when he formulated attachment theory, humans are born extraordinarily vulnerable and dependent, and they require a long period to mature. They cannot protect themselves. So, in addition to being fed, they urgently need to be protected. The attachment system evolved to solve this problem. Infants are disposed to attract caregiver attention, and later to seek proximity, especially when alarmed. At the same time caregivers are disposed to respond to and protect infants. Without such a system human infants could not survive. Parents do not need to reinforce proximity; this tendency is built into the infant, just as attraction to infants is built into parents. If someone is there to be with the infant in an ongoing way, the infant will become attached to that person, even if they are physically mistreated. It is very difficult to explain the attachments of abused children using reinforcement theory. But it is no problem from within the framework of attachment theory. It is a biological imperative. Infants have no choice but to be attached to the individuals who care for them.

This is a powerful biological system. It is why even as adults we at times feel apprehensive when alone. We are more at ease when connected with others. For infants and young children, separation from attachment figures is inherently anxiety provoking, especially in unfamiliar surroundings. These are “natural cues for danger.” This is why separating young immigrant children from their parents at the United States–Mexico border, as was done in 2018, was so egregious and immoral. The situation of these children could not have been more unfamiliar. Such separations were certain to be traumatic, with lasting impacts quite possible.

Attachment as a Relationship Concept

In addition to being a concept rooted in biology, attachment is also inherently a relationship concept. It is about a specific emotional connection between the infant and a particular caregiver. In fact, Bowlby defined attachment as the emotional bond between infant and caregiver. In contrast to the earlier concept of dependency, attachment is not a trait of the infant. Attachments with different parents may be qualitatively distinctive, each being based on the nature of the interactive history. The infant may in some cases even be securely attached with one but anxiously attached to the other. And, of course, primary attachments may be with adoptive parents, grandparents, or others who rear the child. In any case it is based on the building of a relationship over time.

The entire system is governed by an integration of emotion and cognition. Once an attachment relationship has formed, feelings of distress will prompt the infant to seek contact with the attachment figure. Absence of such reactions is an aberration in the developing system.

The attachment relationship is a deeply meaningful relationship. Consider a video of 12-month-old Tina in our observation room, as part of the Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Risk and Adaptation. She is shown on the floor playing with an array of toys, while her mother sits in a chair across the room. Tina picks up several toys, examining them closely, one by one. She next picks up a toy elephant and looks at it intently. Then her eyes widen and a look of wonder and joy spreads across her face. Everyone viewing this video knows exactly what will happen next. She turns and shows the toy to her mother! This pattern of behavior makes visible the intangible – the emotional connection that is the attachment relationship. She remembers and knows full well that her mother is there, and she expects her mother to respond. Her mother nods and smiles back. It is remarkable how automatically the baby shares her joy. This reaction is based upon a history of emotional sharing. Later in this observational session, Tina is distressed following a brief separation. When her mother returns, Tina immediately crawls to her, reaches to be picked up, and plasters her body against her mother. She settles completely and then returns her attention to the room. She knows exactly where her security lies. It is obvious to all observers that this is a special, vital relationship.

Like all relationships, the attachment relationship develops over time. In the early months, both attention and smiles from infants can be elicited from a wide variety of persons. Then infants become more discriminating, with smiles readily elicited by familiar persons and more sober (and perhaps even wary) reactions to unfamiliar persons. Finally, in the second half-year there is an elaborated system of emotions, the concept of person permanence, and the capacity to organize behavior around specific persons. The specific attachment emerges. This is true for all cognitively typical infants in all cultures. Variations in the quality of this relationship depend on the interactive history with the particular caregiver, but all infants become attached to persons who care for them through this process.

Learning is important in this position. But the learning that is emphasized is not the piecemeal learning of specific behaviors; rather, it is learning to organize a diverse array of possible behaviors around the caregiver so as to promote the infant’s wellbeing. It is an experiential, procedural learning about relationships. When young infants are picked up and given care when they cry, they do not learn to cry more. They learn that their signals will receive a response. By the end of the first year, when they have other ways to signal needs, they in fact may cry less than infants whose early cries were not answered. They have not learned to be “crybabies”; they have learned that their caregivers will respond, that they are potent, and that relationships have a reciprocating nature.

Most infants are “secure” in their attachments. This does not mean that they are tightly attached. All infants raised by someone have durable attachments. It means that these infants are secure in the sense that they are confident in the reliability and responsiveness of the caregiver. They know their caregiver is there for them, a consistent source of reassurance and comforting. It also means that the relationship is effective. One can see all of this readily in the infant’s behavior. In play, the infant may reach a toy back over the shoulder without even turning to look that the parent will take it. When distressed, the infant immediately seeks out the parent. The infant’s confidence allows it to explore away from the caregiver in circumstances of low stress and to be quickly settled and reassured when distressed (so they can return again to exploration). Such a balance between attachment and exploration promotes the development of competence in the world.

Some infants have “anxious” attachments with their caregivers. This means that these infants are not confident regarding the parent’s responsiveness to their signals. If parents have been inconsistent or haphazard in care provided, the infant becomes uncertain that the parent will respond should a need arise. The infant must then hover near them and seek reassurance at the slightest provocation. They may well have difficulty truly settling. They often struggle against contact even when they want it. This is referred to as the “resistant” pattern of attachment, and it rather obviously compromises exploration.

Alternatively, the parent may have been chronically emotionally cold, or chronically rebuffed the infant’s bids for close contact, so that the infant learns to stifle attachment needs whenever possible. Beyond being doubtful about parent response, these infants in fact expect that they will not respond, especially when tender needs are aroused. Thus, they may fail to go to the parent when stressed. This is the “avoidant” pattern of attachment and compromises exploration in a different way, because the infant has difficulty using the parent as a resource when distressed.

Finally, as described by Mary Main and Erik Hesse, some parents pose an even greater challenge to their infants, because they enter into dissociative states and/or are otherwise directly frightening to their infants. This creates an irresolvable paradox. All human infants are motivated to flee from the source of fear, but, in addition, they are motivated to flee to the attachment figure for protection. It is impossible for infants to flee from the source of fear and to the parent when they are one and the same. This leads to what is called “disorganized” attachment, a pattern that will be discussed fully in later chapters.

Given this perspective on the formation of attachment, there are two central claims made by attachment theory: (1) That patterns of interaction between infant and caregiver become internalized and organized into various patterns of attachment; and (2) these variations in attachment provide the foundation for later personality; that is, the organized meaning system of the individual. Both of these claims have been amply supported by research. As will be discussed next, the concept of meaning is central to the entire process, from defining crucial features of infant–parent interaction, to defining features of attachment and assessing them, and to selecting later outcomes for confirmation of the theory.

Capturing Meaning in Parent–Infant Interaction

Mary Ainsworth, a gifted researcher with a discerning clinical eye, was one of the first to clearly see and describe the nature of the attachment relationship between human infants and their caregivers (Waters et al., Reference Waters, Vaughn and Waters2024). In her work she stressed the importance of looking at patterns of behavior and the surrounding context in order to see the meaning of parent–infant interactions. One of the major findings in attachment research is that differences in quality of an infant’s attachment are not well predicted by frequencies of any particular maternal behavior. How frequently one talks to a baby, how frequently one picks up a baby, or even how much one holds a baby do not predict the degree of attachment security. Rather, the key is the degree to which parental behaviors are sensitive and responsive to the infant’s needs and signals and the way in which these behaviors are coordinated with, or interfere with, the flow of the infant’s behavior.

When she conducted her field observations in Uganda, Ainsworth’s initial plan was to focus solely on how the attachment relationship unfolded. She had expected that all of the infants would be secure in their attachments. After all these mothers routinely carried their babies in slings, and the popular stereotype was that the breast was continuously accessible to infants in that culture. On the surface, therefore, it would seem that responsiveness would be guaranteed. What she in fact found was variation in the degree to which infants were secure or anxious in their attachments. The surprises did not end there. Not only was the stereotype about breastfeeding inaccurate, length of breastfeeding per se was not related to attachment security; rather, most relevant was the degree to which the mother took pleasure in the feedings – what it meant to her.

Moreover, general measures of warmth or quantitative measures such as how much the mother talked to the baby did not forecast security. What mattered most was whether parental behaviors were attuned and responsive to the infant’s signals of intent. The sensitive caregiver “… is exquisitely attuned to B’s signals; and responds to them promptly and appropriately. She is able to see things from B’s point of view; her perceptions of his signals and communications are not distorted by her own needs and defenses” (Ainsworth, Reference Ainsworth1967, p. 361). Rather than simply doing lots of things, they do the right thing at the right time. Ainsworth also found that these sensitive mothers were excellent observers and reporters regarding their babies. They knew their babies and, perhaps most notably, delighted in them. Ainsworth’s work was a precursor to the current emphasis in the attachment field on the state of the parent’s mind and parent ability to see, reflect on, and attend to the mind of the baby.

Parents described by Ainsworth’s scales as sensitive are not only emotionally invested in their infants but are also alert to their signals, accurately interpret the meaning of the behavior, and respond in a congruent manner. Other parents fail to notice the signal, distort its meaning, and/or respond inappropriately or ineffectively. They may simply not do the right things, or they do all of the right things, but not at the right time. The sensitive caregiver “picks up the baby when he seems to wish it and puts him down when he wants to explore.” Those with less sensitivity try to “socialize with him when he is hungry, play with him when he is tired, or feed him when he is trying to initiate social interaction.” Responses of sensitive caregivers are to “the baby’s own timing and not the mother’s timing.” In short, sensitive caregivers recognize the meaning of the infant behavior and respond to that meaning. This is the beginning of deep-seated feelings of being seen and being known in the infant.

In Ainsworth’s later Baltimore study there were also many illustrations of the importance of responding to the meaning of the infant’s behavior, in contrast to sheer amount of interaction. As a poignant example, mothers of infants later found to have avoidant attachments held their infants on average as much as mothers of those infants later found to be secure. But, specifically, when the infant came to them and sought to be picked up and held – that is, signaled its emotional need – these parents often rebuffed them. It is when these infants express need that parents turn them away; at other times they do hold them. A clinical interpretation of this rejecting behavior is that these parents are somehow threatened by the expressions of need, perhaps because to recognize it would be to acknowledge their own unmet needs for nurturance. Because of their potent procedural memories, the infants learn to later withhold their own needs for contact and so fail to go to their mothers when stressed. In the histories of those infants with secure attachments, mothers routinely responded to the baby’s desire for contact. These babies later quickly seek and are readily reassured by contact when they are threatened. Picking up a baby who is crying or who has arms outstretched has different meaning than picking up a baby who wants to play. The amount of holding overall may be similar, but there is a great difference in meaning of being held when it suits the parent and being held when it is what the infant needs.

Measuring the Quality of Attachment

This same attention to meaning characterizes Ainsworth’s scales for assessing attachment behavior of infants in her laboratory procedure, called the Strange Situation, and in her overall scheme for assessing the quality of the infant–parent attachment. In looking at behavior Ainsworth provided an alternative to either counting frequencies of discrete behaviors (for example, how often an infant looks at the mother) or subjective, overall ratings without specific behavioral referents. Counting specific behaviors, while easy to do, turns out to have limited value in capturing the quality of the relationship and little or no stability across time or situations. Subjective ratings are largely unreliable. Therefore, a third alternative was needed.

Close, careful observation is at the core of the Ainsworth system, but observers attend to the meaning of behavior in addition to simple occurrence or frequency; that is, one attends to the timing and context of the behavior, including other behaviors that occur with it or before or after it. Ainsworth’s scales group infant’s behavior as similarly strong or weak based on similarity of intent. For example, after a 3-minute separation from the parent in the laboratory, one baby approaches halfway to the adult and then looks up and waits for the parent to come pick them up. Another looks, smiles broadly, vocalizes, and shows a toy but does not immediately approach and does not get picked up. This baby does approach the adult several times over the next few minutes to share a toy or briefly play beside them. As different as these reactions are, they mean the same thing in terms of desire for physical contact. Both of these infants show the same moderate degree of need and desire for proximity or contact in this situation (scored 3), and they show no avoidance of the parent. Neither is as strong as the case of an infant who cries, leans forward, and reaches strongly for the parent (clearly indicating a desire to be picked up, even though not approaching) or the infant who immediately goes the whole way but then waits for pick-up (both scored 5). Stronger desire for contact is indicated by an infant that fully approaches and reaches for pick up (scored 6) or one that goes the whole way and wraps arms around the mother’s legs (7, the highest score). It is the infant’s desire for proximity and contact that is being scored, not approaching per se. All of these are distinctive from cases in which the infant merely looks at the parent or merely gives a brief smile.

This same approach is used for all of the scales coded in the reunion episodes of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation procedure, including the crucial “avoidance” and “resistance” scales. For example, after one of the brief separations in the laboratory room, low level avoidance may be shown by looking at the mother (or other attachment figure) when she comes in, then briefly looking away, then becoming responsive; or by not looking at the mother briefly and then soon becoming responsive. Both of these examples would be scored 3 because they show the same modest degree of withholding attention; they mean the same thing. A notably higher score (5) would be given to both of the following examples: (a) The infant gives the mother no greeting despite her efforts to gain his attention. After 15 seconds he does give her his attention but remains fairly unresponsive; or (b) The infant immediately greets the mother and starts to approach her; then he markedly turns away and ignores her efforts to gain his attention for some time. Again, it is the degree of withholding that is scored, not simply whether the infant greets or not. Neither of these examples is scored as high as the infant who pays little or no attention to the mother for an extended period (scored 6), or the infant that behaves in this way despite the mother’s strong efforts to gain his attention (7). Note again, that what is being scored is the degree to which the infant is withholding expression of attachment behavior, as well as the role of context. The difference in judging a 6 and a 7 hinges on noting the strength of the mother’s efforts, a key part of the context of the withholding behavior.

In contrast to avoidance, resistance refers to fighting against contact with the attachment figure, even though the infant obviously wants it. It is scored with the same attention to meaning. For example, two subtle signs of anger, such as a little kicking of the feet while being held or dropping a toy offered by the mother while in her arms are both scored 3. Repeated rejection of toys shows a higher level of resistance (5), but so too does squirming to be put down after being picked up by the mother, only to seek pick-up again. At this level, it is clear that the infant’s anger is interfering with becoming settled. The highest scores are reserved for conspicuous and ongoing anger, such as crying hard and arching the back while being held, strong kicks of the legs, throwing down toys while crying and the like. They are obviously fighting against the contact they need. Different infants will show different combinations of behavior, and it takes weeks of training to do these assessments properly. At the center of the training is what the behavior means. Does the infant’s behavior promote or interfere with the contact he needs?

The meaning of behavior, derived from the way it is organized, is also the basis for judging the overall security of the attachment relationship. It is not whether a baby approaches the mother, or cries, or engages in play, but when and how it does these things, what other behaviors are also present, and how behavior shifts across contexts. Each of the babies described when we discussed contact seeking may well be equally secure in their attachments, given that other observations confirm that they are each getting and effectively using the contact they need. On the other hand, some babies who have been distressed may start to strongly approach the parent, and then markedly turn away. While this may indicate strong desire for contact, the approach accompanied by the clear turn away means something very different than a moderate interest in contact by itself. The abrupt inhibiting of the approach when an infant has been distressed suggests a withholding of attachment feelings and suggests an avoidant attachment organization.

Judging avoidance requires careful attention to the meaning of the behavior. Specific behaviors that appear quite similar on the surface can mean quite different things. Consider a baby who, after starting to approach the caregiver, veers off to pick up a toy. Is this infant cutting off attention to the caregiver or not? This can only be determined by examining more of the context. If the baby simply goes to the toy, fiddles with it aimlessly with no further attention to the parent, this would be a clear indicator of avoidance. The meaning of the behavior is redirecting the attention away from the attachment figure. On the other hand, were this a toy the pair had been playing with earlier in the session, and if the infant immediately upon getting to the toy picked it up, turned and showed it to the mother with a smile or vocalization, this can all be seen as a continuation of the infant’s desire for interaction. In the absence of stress, starting to approach the mother with a toy, then being distracted by another object and veering off to get it to show to the mother does not suggest avoidance or defensiveness, because in this case the infant follows through on his intention to engage the mother.

The central question concerns the infant’s confidence in the responsiveness of the caregiver, especially with regard to addressing emotional needs. When an infant is confident that, should some threat arise, it can turn to the caregiver and expect to get the needed support, it is then free to explore the environment. Thus, a secure attachment relationship is effective in promoting exploration, discovery, and learning how to function in the environment. Attachment and exploration are in balance. Given the emphasis on the interplay between exploration and seeking proximity, contact, or reassurance from the caregiver, it is clear why simply examining the frequency of certain behaviors cannot be revealing. Infants that hover by caregivers at all times, and infants who fail to go to them when distressed both compromise exploration. The infant that plays readily in the absence of stress, but actively seeks comforting and support when distressed, is optimally able to explore because it is effective in using the attachment figure to regulate arousal. Moreover, contact seeking can be done in a number of ways (vocalizing, reaching, crawling to the parent). Sometimes even a mere look at the smiling mother will suffice. What these diverse behaviors have in common is their meaning. They mean the infant unambivalently desires connection and is able to use that connection in support of exploration.

When playing, some babies engage their parents with frequent showing of toys. This means something very different from hovering and wanting to be picked up in the absence of any external stress. Both infants are attached and interested in their caregivers, but the latter pattern suggests anxiety about the relationship; that is, uncertainty regarding parental availability and responsiveness. It predicts great difficulty settling after the brief separations.

Other babies may play contentedly for some time with only occasional looks at the mother. This relative absence of looking means something very different than looking away from and ignoring mother’s offerings right upon reunion when the child has been stressed by separation (behavior not shown to a stranger). In neither case does the baby interact with great frequency with the attachment figure, but only the second failing to look is avoidance, because it reveals a cutting off of feelings at a time when feelings clearly are aroused. Contented play in the absence of stress may simply mean the infant is comfortable. The meaning of being occupied with toys can only be determined by the way the behavior is organized in the rest of the session.

Many 12-month-old babies, including those with clearly secure attachment relationships, attend to and engage a stranger, even smiling and showing toys in the mother’s presence before the brief separations. This tells us little. It can mean lack of interest in the mother, but it can also mean that the infant feels comfortable enough to explore and engage the stranger. By itself, it certainly does not indicate an anxious attachment. However, when frightened or distressed, clear preference for the attachment figure should occur. Infants secure in their attachment show a clear preference for interaction and/or contact with attachment figures when distressed.

Thus, it is the meaning of the infant’s behavior that allows us to judge the quality of the relationship. Remarkably, even though the behavioral repertoire and the cognitive abilities of the infant change dramatically over time, the assessed quality of the attachment often remains the same (Waters, Reference Waters1978). A 12-month-old is likely to be distressed by the separation and reunion procedures we use, and many will desire ample physical contact upon reunion. If such contact seeking is effective in smoothly alleviating the infant’s distress, a secure attachment relationship is reflected. This same child, at 18 months, may be minimally distressed and may simply wish to interact and show toys to the parent. If this is done actively and effectively, promoting exploration, it shows the same secure attachment, even though all of the surface behavior may be different. These behavior profiles have the same meaning; namely that the infant is confident in the availability and support of the parent. While complex, following training such judgments can be made with high reliability using the Ainsworth system.

The Reality and Power of Relationships

A major discovery in the physical world was that the behavior of molecules is not simply determined by the constituent atoms, but rather by the relationships among the atoms as manifest in their particular geometry. Two molecules with the same atoms could have different qualities. Such findings moved physics beyond a purely atomistic view of the world toward a view emphasizing process. In the same way, it is not particular behaviors of the caregiver that lead to a secure attachment but the way the behavior is fitted to the needs, mood, and behavior of the infant. And it is not the set of behaviors manifest by infants that reveals the quality of the attachment, but the way the infant behavior is organized around the caregiver. It is the relationships we are studying, not merely the individuals.

The power of this relationship perspective can be shown by demonstrating the stability of attachment relationships between 12 and 18 months (Waters, Reference Waters1978). This stability in the quality of the relationship occurred despite the fact that the behavioral repertoire of infants changes dramatically during this period and behavior is expressed quite differently. It is the core meanings of the relationship that are preserved. Infants that were confident in the relationship remain confident though they show this in different ways. The relationship and the meanings can change, of course. Our work showed that, when family stress declined, parents became more responsive and infants became more confident when they had anxious attachments before (Vaughn et al., Reference Vaughn, Waters, Egeland and Sroufe1979). (This is one reason we will point out the inadvisability of blaming parents for child problems at various places in this book. The context of parenting must be taken into account.)

As we will discuss more fully in subsequent chapters, it is also the quality of the relationship that predicts later child behavior, not specific behaviors of infants independent of context and meaning. Beyond the behavioral expressions of infant and parent, it is the organization and interplay of their joint behaviors that is most significant. Close relationships show a coherence that at times is even beyond the coherence of the participating individuals. From infant attachment assessments, which focus on how infants organize their behavior around caregivers, one can predict later parent behavior, as well as child behavior, and even behavior of parents with subsequent children and behavior of siblings. This is all because the relationship is being captured.

The main point is this: Before there is an organized personality, there is an organized caregiving network around the infant, with attachment figures as the center. It is this organization that is the prototype for what will become the self. This is despite the fact that these early relationship experiences lie outside of consciousness. None of us are able to consciously remember what we experienced in the first 2 years of our lives. It is not just that we are unable to report on our memories. They simply are not there in verbal or symbolic form, but only in the form of emotionally salient procedural memories.

It is not possible to recall any specific instances when you were an infant or young toddler of turning to your parent with apprehension and receiving a smile and nod of reassurance (or not); or of being frightened and seeking and finding contact and comforting or being turned away. It’s not possible to remember specific times when joy was shared or you encountered a blank face or even a disdainful look. But the repeating pattern of such events is internalized as a sequence of behavioral and emotional experiences, as a “script” for the self in relationships. This is the power of procedural memory even prior to well-developed, long-term event memory.

The lack of conscious memory certainly does not mean that what we experienced is of no consequence or left no legacy. As we will show in Chapter 10, one can predict how parents will treat their own toddlers based on assessments made when they themselves were 2-years-old, when verbal memory was quite limited. The case can even be made that preverbal experience in ways has more power than later experience. Being unable to consciously remember these experiences means that they cannot be examined or directly modified.

Because development is “cumulative,” always building on what was previously there, early experience has a special place in the formation of our inner worldviews. As we will discuss thoroughly in Parts III and IV, changes in world views can happen at any age. For example, in the Minnesota study, we found that when parents reported increases in social support some children who had been anxiously attached as infants were thriving in kindergarten. Nonetheless, certain basic expectations and “attitudes” begin to be laid down in the early years, and these impact how later experiences are engaged, interpreted, and reacted to. Moreover, early experiences exercise a “tuning” effect on the central nervous system itself, conditioning stress reactivity and basic capacities for regulation of arousal.

According to Bowlby, two of the major meanings that come out of infancy concern expectations regarding caregivers and expectations regarding self – two sides of the same coin. If my caregivers have been consistently responsive, I come to expect that they will be responsive. Since this is a core of my interpersonal experience, by generalization I will expect responsiveness from others. At the same time, since my caregivers have been responsive to my actions, I come to expect that my actions will be effective. This is the very foundation for a more general sense of efficacy or competence, a core meaning that begins to be established even in the first year of life. Since knowledge of caregiver responsiveness grants confidence to explore the environment, emerging competence is also reinforced by experiences of mastery in the object world.

We would add to Bowlby’s account that, in learning about self and other, the infant is also evolving a basic understanding about how relationships work. When one is in need the other responds, or, in contrast, when one is in need the other rejects or exploits vulnerability. Again, this is not at first a conscious knowing but a deep emotional knowing. The emotional knowing is the developmental prototype for the later cognitive/emotional knowing. It was this premise that allowed us to predict individual differences in empathy in later years. Through responsiveness to need, one does not learn only the role of the needy one but a pattern of relating.

Thus, among the early core meanings that infants in supportive relationships acquire are that there is predictability in the world, that others can be counted on, that I am able to draw upon others, and that relationships are valuable. When significant others respond accurately to the meanings of the infant’s intentions and behaviors, this affirms their sense of reality. It is nothing less than the foundation for a solid grasp of reality in later life.

For some infants, of course, experience teaches that the world is unpredictable or predictably rejecting; that others are inconsistently available or perhaps especially unavailable when my needs for tender care are acute; that my efforts to reach out will be frustrated; that I am unworthy of care; or that relationships are fraught with difficulty or even beyond me.

Moreover, for those who have experienced a chronically emotionally unavailable caregiver or who have been repeatedly rebuffed when seeking tender care, there is a tendency to cut themselves off from certain feelings or states, to not attend to them when they arise, and ultimately to even avoid things reminiscent of those states and circumstances that may arouse them. On the other hand, for those who experienced markedly inconsistent, haphazard care, they may be able to attend to states of anxiety, threat, and distress but be unable to reconcile or resolve them so that maturation is compromised. All of this is the legacy of early relationships.

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  • Attachment Theory
  • L. Alan Sroufe, University of Minnesota, June Sroufe
  • Book: The Development and Organization of Meaning
  • Online publication: 11 June 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009385480.006
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  • Attachment Theory
  • L. Alan Sroufe, University of Minnesota, June Sroufe
  • Book: The Development and Organization of Meaning
  • Online publication: 11 June 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009385480.006
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  • Attachment Theory
  • L. Alan Sroufe, University of Minnesota, June Sroufe
  • Book: The Development and Organization of Meaning
  • Online publication: 11 June 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009385480.006
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