Book contents
- Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics
- Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Disability: Definitions and Theories
- Part II Disability in the Beginning and the End of Life
- Introduction to Part II
- 4 Abortion, the Disabilities of Pregnancy, and the Dignity of Risk
- 5 The Down Syndrome Information Act and “Mere Difference”: Redefining the Scope of Prenatal Testing Conversations?
- 6 Dementia, Disability, and Advance Medical Directives: Defensible Standards for Dementia Care
- Part III Disability in the Clinical Setting
- Part IV Equality, Expertise, and Access
- Part V Disability, Intersectionality, and Social Movements
- Part VI Quantifying Disability
4 - Abortion, the Disabilities of Pregnancy, and the Dignity of Risk
from Part II - Disability in the Beginning and the End of Life
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 April 2020
- Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics
- Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Disability: Definitions and Theories
- Part II Disability in the Beginning and the End of Life
- Introduction to Part II
- 4 Abortion, the Disabilities of Pregnancy, and the Dignity of Risk
- 5 The Down Syndrome Information Act and “Mere Difference”: Redefining the Scope of Prenatal Testing Conversations?
- 6 Dementia, Disability, and Advance Medical Directives: Defensible Standards for Dementia Care
- Part III Disability in the Clinical Setting
- Part IV Equality, Expertise, and Access
- Part V Disability, Intersectionality, and Social Movements
- Part VI Quantifying Disability
Summary
When abortion is discussed in the context of destigmatizing disability, it is usually in connection with the potential disabilities of the fetus. Disability rights activists increasingly encourage both lawmakers setting abortion policy and women contemplating abortion to think that a life with disabilities is worth living. In particular, they argue that a fetus diagnosed with Down syndrome, let alone one with a cleft palate, should not for that reason be aborted. While taking this line of argument into account, this chapter will shift the frame of reference to various ways in which the law and bioethics of abortion treat pregnant women as disabled.
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- Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics , pp. 51 - 63Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020