The arguments of the last chapter show that collective action by comfortable people in affluent societies could greatly diminish the demands benefiting the poor would make on them as individuals, and not simply because individuals might then be responsible only for their fractional contribution of the total amount redistributed. To the extent that people do things because others around them do – that is, to a great extent, as I have been arguing – having less constitutes a much smaller sacrifice if others also have less, for a variety of reasons we have seen. Thus, if people act together, we do not have to expect individuals to be saints or heroes to make huge inroads into alleviating poverty. And so we are forced neither to acknowledge onerous individual duties nor to minimize our moral responsibilities.

But these arguments about the significance of relative deprivation give rise to several puzzles. First, if well-being is so dependent on what others around you have, and assuming an equal distribution of goods is impossible, then the poor will always be with us. No matter what we do, there will be people at the bottom of the ladder, so what’s the point of attempting to eradicate poverty? Second, why should we benefit the global poor rather than the poor of our own (affluent) societies – who are, after all, “around us” in a way the faraway poor are not? On the other hand – third – even the poorest people in developed societies are rich by global standards. Does that mean they are not in fact really poor?