The requirement of public speech

Let us consider the spectator's position. Take the case of a spectator contemplating a suffering unfortunate from afar, someone unknown to him and who is nothing to him, neither relative nor friend nor enemy even. Such a spectacle is clearly problematic. It may even be that this is the only spectacle capable of posing a specifically moral dilemma to someone exposed to it. In fact, when a spectator is faced with any other spectacle that he judges to be without interest, or even indecent, he has the easy option of withdrawing his attention: leaving the room, stopping reading, turning the television off, etc. But when he is faced with suffering such behaviour is not self-evident because in this case he could be accused, or may accuse himself, of indifference. Now, as we have seen, having knowledge of suffering points to an obligation to give assistance. Why else present a spectacle of suffering human beings to unconcerned people if not to draw their attention to it and so direct them to action?

If the spectator does not exit, which is already to take up a position, the least unacceptable option open to him is – following the famous distinction introduced by Albert Hirschman – to make his voice heard. It is by speaking up that the spectator can maintain his integrity when, brought face to face with suffering, he is called upon to act in a situation in which direct action is difficult or impossible.