In the final chapter, I offer some concluding reflections. First, I show that party-building experience by the CCP and the KMT during their violent struggles cast a long shadow on political development in mainland China and Taiwan after 1949, respectively. I illustrate that CCP elites developed strong preferences for a strong leader because Mao’s domination revived the CCP. In addition, the CCP frequently employed the same tactics in of mobilized compliance to implement unpopular policies after 1949, a practice that ultimately hindered the institutionalization of China’s political system. Meanwhile, the KMT leaders recognized the superior organization of the CCP as a decisive factor in its downfall. As a result, the KMT shifted its focus toward fostering elite cohesion and grassroots party structures in Taiwan. Although this strategy initially bore fruit for the KMT’s power consolidation in Taiwan, the party still relied on elite mobilization infrastructure for societal penetration. The KMT’s clientelistic machine eventually broke down when Taiwan democratized, losing its power monopoly to the Democratic Progressive Party. Finally, I revisit the seemingly miraculous reversal of fortune of the CCP and the KMT, highlighting both leadership domination and resource mobilization as the key foundations of powerful revolutionary parties. I further underscore the significance of contingencies in comprehending the political evolution of revolutionary parties.