Philosophers Alba Montes Sánchez and Dan Zahavi investigate the phenomenology of “survivor shame.” Shame occupies a central and somewhat paradoxical place among the emotions we associate with mass atrocity. Observers have noted that we seldom find shame where we should find it or where we would expect to find it (that is, in the perpetrators and bystanders), while we do find it among the survivors. This “survivor shame” has been widely discussed, by Primo Levi, Ruth Leys, Giorgio Agamben, and others. Sánchez and Zahavi fault much of this literature for having failed to differentiate between varieties of shame, and for having paid insufficient attention to the temporality of these emotions. It is crucial to distinguish the shame that arises in immediate response to the abuses from the shame that occurs in the aftermath. It is also crucial to recognize the difference between being shamed and feeling ashamed. The relations between these phenomena are not entirely straightforward: being shamed can elicit a wide range of emotional responses, and shame is not always one of them. Survivor shame, Sánchez and Zahavi conclude, presupposes empathy in both victim and perpetrator—a fact that should cause us to rethink the very nature of the victimization involved in genocide and mass atrocity.