“I don't want to! Why should I?”
“Because more people will be happier if you do than if you don't.”
“So what? I don't care about other people.”
“You should.”
“But why?”
“Because more people will be happier if you do than if you don't.”
(Katherine Tait, My Father Bertrand Russell, 1970: 184–5)Moral theory and deliberative practice again
What place in a good person's deliberations can a moral theory have? Towards the end of Chapter 8, we explored this question as it arises for the moral theory called virtue ethics. We noted that the virtue ethical account of rightness says this:
Virtue ethics: An action is right iff it is the action that a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances.
(Or something like that. We developed some complications about what the exact formula should be in §8.6, but we need not revisit these now.)
We also noted in Chapter 8 that any plausible moral theory is bound to be about more than simply action. It needs to have something to say, for instance, about emotion, response, choice and deliberation as well. Hence we can produce formulas like the following that parallel the account of rightness:
An emotion is right iff it is the emotion that a virtuous agent would characteristically feel in the circumstances;
A response is right iff it is the response that a virtuous agent would characteristically produce in the circumstances;
A choice is right iff it is the choice that a virtuous agent would characteristically make in the circumstances;
A deliberation is right iff it is a deliberation that a virtuous agent would characteristically perform in the circumstances;
and so on.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.