Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The basic model
- 3 The war of attrition
- 4 Games with genetic models
- 5 Learning the ESS
- 6 Mixed strategies – I. A classification of mechanisms
- 7 Mixed strategies – II. Examples
- 8 Asymmetric games – I. Ownership
- 9 Asymmetric games – II. A classification, and some illustrative examples
- 10 Asymmetric games – III. Sex and generation games
- 11 Life history strategies and the size game
- 12 Honesty, bargaining and commitment
- 13 The evolution of cooperation
- 14 Postscript
- Appendixes
- Explanation of main terms
- References
- Subject index
- Author index
8 - Asymmetric games – I. Ownership
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The basic model
- 3 The war of attrition
- 4 Games with genetic models
- 5 Learning the ESS
- 6 Mixed strategies – I. A classification of mechanisms
- 7 Mixed strategies – II. Examples
- 8 Asymmetric games – I. Ownership
- 9 Asymmetric games – II. A classification, and some illustrative examples
- 10 Asymmetric games – III. Sex and generation games
- 11 Life history strategies and the size game
- 12 Honesty, bargaining and commitment
- 13 The evolution of cooperation
- 14 Postscript
- Appendixes
- Explanation of main terms
- References
- Subject index
- Author index
Summary
The distinction between symmetric and asymmetric games was discussed on p. 22. In this chapter I shall discuss further games which have the following properties:
(i) Every contest is between a pair of individuals one of which is in role A (e.g. ‘owner’, ‘larger’, ‘older’) and the other in role B (e.g. ‘intruder’, ‘smaller’, ‘younger’).
(ii) Both contestants know for certain which role they occupy.
(iii) The same strategy set (e.g. escalate, retaliate, display, etc.) is available to both contestants.
The role may influence the chances of winning an escalated contest, or the value of winning. More complex contests, in which more than one asymmetry is present, in which there is uncertainty about roles, or in which different strategy sets are available to the two contestants, are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.
It is convenient to start with the simple Hawk–Dove game, with payoffs shown in Table 11 (which is identical to Table 1, repeated here for convenience). We suppose, however, that each contest is between an owner (e.g. of a territory) and an intruder, and that the contestants know which role they occupy. For the present, we also suppose that ownership does not alter the value of the resource, or the chance of winning an escalated contest. Then, as on p. 22, we can introduce a third strategy, B or ‘Bourgeois’, viz. ‘If owner, Hawk; if intruder, Dove’.
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- Evolution and the Theory of Games , pp. 94 - 105Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982