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Chapter 12 - Causation and the mental

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Peter van Inwagen
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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Summary

I have some rather extreme ideas about ontology – and when I say this, I’m not alluding to the ideas about tables and chairs and organisms that the phrase ‘van Inwagen's extreme ideas about ontology’ would no doubt suggest to many philosophers. I’m alluding rather to certain ideas I have that belong to the most abstract (and the most abstruse) part of ontology, the part that pertains to the concepts of substance and attribute and the relations between them.

I have some very odd ideas about causation – notice that I distinguish the extreme from the very odd in the realm of ideas – and some very odd ideas about the relation between the mental and the physical. (Or perhaps I should say “about the traditional opposition between the mental and the physical,” since the phrase ‘the relation between the mental and the physical’ suggests something having to do with causation, and the odd ideas I’m alluding to are not ideas about the way the mental and the physical are causally related.)

Type
Chapter
Information
Existence
Essays in Ontology
, pp. 238 - 258
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

A representative statement can be found in his Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 39
“Causation and Mental Causation,” in Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, eds., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 227–242

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