My topic is two recent attacks on metaphysics by two very distinguished philosophers, Bas van Fraassen and Hilary Putnam. I must concede at the outset that neither of these philosophers describes his target as “metaphysics.” Van Fraassen's announced target is “analytic metaphysics” and Putnam's announced target is “ontology.” It is my conviction, however, that if either of these attacks were successful, very little that could be called metaphysics would survive it. I therefore stand by my title and am happy to call both van Fraassen and Putnam antimetaphysicians.

I will discuss only two texts, van Fraassen's Terry Lectures (particularly the lecture “Against Analytic Metaphysics”) and Putnam's Hermes Lectures (particularly the lectures “A Defense of Conceptual Relativity” and “Ontology: An Obituary”).

There are striking similarities between the central argument of van Fraassen’s attack on analytical metaphysics and the central argument of Putnam’s attack on ontology. Each argument has at its core an example of a simple metaphysical question – one might even say a “toy” metaphysical question – that is supposed to serve as an illustration of what is wrong with the questions addressed by analyticalmetaphysics and ontology. Both these toy questions, moreover, have to do with parts and wholes, and indeed are very closely connected questions about parts and wholes – are almost the same question. I’m not sure what significance to attribute to that fact, since, as we shall see, the arguments that van Fraassen and Putnam use to draw conclusions from their examinations of the two toy questions are very different.