Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Part I Realism about Value and Morality
- 1 Moral Realism (1986)
- 2 Facts and Values (1986)
- 3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative (1993)
- 4 Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism (1997)
- 5 Red, Bitter, Good (1998)
- Part II Normative Moral Theory
- Part III The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity
- Index
1 - Moral Realism (1986)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Part I Realism about Value and Morality
- 1 Moral Realism (1986)
- 2 Facts and Values (1986)
- 3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative (1993)
- 4 Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism (1997)
- 5 Red, Bitter, Good (1998)
- Part II Normative Moral Theory
- Part III The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity
- Index
Summary
Among contemporary philosophers, even those who have not found skepticism about empirical science at all compelling have tended to find skepticism about morality irresistible. For various reasons, among them an understandable suspicion of moral absolutism, it has been thought a mark of good sense to explain away any appearance of objectivity in moral discourse. So common has it become in secular intellectual culture to treat morality as subjective or conventional that most of us now have difficulty imagining what it might be like for there to be facts to which moral judgments answer.
Undaunted, some philosophers have attempted to establish the objectivity of morality by arguing that reason, or science, affords a foundation for ethics. The history of such attempts hardly inspires confidence. Although rationalism in ethics has retained adherents long after other rationalisms have been abandoned, the powerful philosophical currents that have worn away at the idea that unaided reason might afford a standpoint from which to derive substantive conclusions show no signs of slackening. And ethical naturalism has yet to find a plausible synthesis of the empirical and the normative: the more it has given itself over to descriptive accounts of the origin of norms, the less has it retained recognizably moral force; the more it has undertaken to provide a recognizable basis for moral criticism or reconstruction, the less has it retained a firm connection with descriptive social or psychological theory.
In what follows, I will present in a programmatic way a form of ethical naturalism that owes much to earlier theorists, but that seeks to effect a more satisfactory linkage of the normative to the empirical.
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- Facts, Values, and NormsEssays toward a Morality of Consequence, pp. 3 - 42Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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