Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2025
Introduction
The initial and visceral response to an act of suicide terrorism is often one of utter disbelief. How can it be that someone felt this horrific action was the most logical step to take? Surely there were other options than blowing oneself up and killing numerous others in the process. This incredulity causes one to attribute some kind of psychological disorder to the terrorist – no sane, or mentally healthy, person could commit such acts. In an earlier work, I noted a similar underlying impulse in much Western writing aimed at discounting the validity of the suicide terrorist's agenda (Gauthier 2015). This propensity reveals a reluctance to accept that terrorists may act while in full control of their faculties or that they have been driven by motivations whose foundations bear similarity to one's own (revenge, renown, meaningfulness, altruism). In fact, many critics and theorists posit suicide terrorists as rational agents performing what they believe are positive actions for the good of their community. In other words, gestures typically conceived of as acts of aggression should also be reframed as evidence of the individual's generosity, selflessness and sacrifice for the welfare of their community. Robert Pape, for instance, observes, ‘the homicidal dimension of the act should not cause us to overlook an important cause leading to it – that many suicide terrorists are killing themselves to advance what they see as the common good’ (180). In this iteration, suicide terrorists are no longer simply intent on the slaughter of innocent civilians, but young people who, misguided or not, sacrifice their lives in the hopes of bringing some measure of relief to their oppressed communities.
But instead of recognising the altruistic motivations of the perpetrator, the observer feels the need to dissociate from, and condemn, the actions of the other. Few wish to risk being perceived as condoning, or worse supporting, murderous behaviour. In other words, not empathising with the terrorist becomes an act of (psychological) self-preservation. For these reasons, the ‘condemnation imperative’, as Ghassan Hage (2003) calls it, is present in much of the intellectual discourse pertaining to such actions.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.