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4 - Respect in deliberation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2012

Jürg Steiner
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Summary

Normative controversies in the literature

There is agreement in the normative literature that mutual respect in the senseof reciprocity is a key element of good deliberation. Thisholds for both speakers and listeners. As Jane Mansbridge etal. put it, “participants should treat one another with mutualrespect and equal concern. They should listen to each other and give reasons toone another that they think the others can comprehend and accept.” Suchmutual respect requires, in the words of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,“an effort to appreciate the moral force of the position with which wedisagree.” There is controversy, however, about the exact definition ofrespect and whether respect should be extended to all arguments or whether thereare arguments that are so distasteful that they do not merit respect.Jürgen Habermas takes the position that all arguments should beconsidered and that good reasoning will allow the cutting of distastefularguments from further discussion. This Habermasian position is forcefullyarticulated by Christian F. Rostbøll who shares with Habermas abackground in critical theory of the Frankfurt School. For Rostbøll, a“basic assumption underlying deliberative democracy, as I see it, is thatno one has privileged access to truth or to the true interests of others. Theonly way to arrive at judgments that have the presumption of having right ontheir side is through public process of deliberation where everyone is free andable to participate.” Italo Testa, another theorist, sets out hisposition in the title of his paper, “Limits of Respect in PublicDialogue,” arguing that not anything goes in political debate:

Respect for the legitimacy of values, beliefs, and preferences should not beconferred a priori, as unconditional and un-retractable.Were it so, we would have as a consequence that anythinggoes: there would be no way to distinguish between legitimate andillegitimate claims, and dialogue would defeat itself and its validitystructure … there will always be some views that we won’t holdas respectable: and this is not a bad thing in itself.

Testa makes the distinction between respect for arguments and respect for personsmaking arguments. He is of the opinion that there are not only arguments butalso persons that do not merit respect.

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The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
Empirical Research and Normative Implications
, pp. 104 - 124
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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References

Mansbridge, JaneBohman, JamesChambers, SimoneEstlund, DavidFollesdal, AndreasFung, ArchonLafont, ChristinaManin, BernardMarti, José LuisThe Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,Journal of Political Philosophy 18 2010 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gutmann, AmyThompson, Dennis F.Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,Ethics 101 1990 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forst, RainerDas Recht auf RechtfertigungFrankfurt a.M.Suhrkamp 2007Google Scholar
Habermas, JürgenBetween Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and DemocracyCambridge, MAMIT Press 1996Google Scholar
Rostbøll, Christian F.Deliberative Freedom: Deliberative Democracy as Critical TheoryAlbanyState University of New York Press 2008Google Scholar
Bohman, JamesLiberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and Reasons That All Can Accept,Journal of Political Philosophy 17 2009 272CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, Kasper M.Deliberative Democracy and Opinion FormationOdenseeUniversity Press of Southern Denmark 2004Google Scholar
Rawls, JohnPolitical LiberalismNew YorkColombia University Press 1993Google Scholar
Habermas, JürgenReligion in the Public Sphere,European Journal of Philosophy 14 2006 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steiner, JürgBächtiger, AndréSpörndli, MarkusSteenbergen, Marco R.Deliberative Politics in Action: Analysing Parliamentary DiscourseCambridge University Press 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reykowski, JanuszDeliberation and Human Nature: An Empirical Approach,Political Psychology 27 2006 323CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wesolowska, ElzbietaSocial Processes of Antagonism and Synergy in Deliberating Groups,Swiss Political Science Review 13 2007 670CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Talpin, JulienSchools of Democracy: How Ordinary Citizens (Sometimes) Become Competent in Participatory Budgeting InstitutionsColchesterECPR Press 2011Google Scholar

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  • Respect in deliberation
  • Jürg Steiner, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • Book: The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 August 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139057486.005
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  • Respect in deliberation
  • Jürg Steiner, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • Book: The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 August 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139057486.005
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Respect in deliberation
  • Jürg Steiner, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • Book: The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 August 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139057486.005
Available formats
×