References
Alicke, Mark D. (2000). “Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame,” Psychology Bulletin 126: 556–74.
Ayer, Alfred J. (1954). “Freedom and Necessity,” in Philosophical Essays, Ayer, Alfred J., ed., London: Macmillan, pp. 271–84.
Baker, Lynne R. (2006). “Moral Responsibility without Libertarianism,” Noûs 40: 307–30.
Balaguer, Mark. (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Balaguer, Mark. (2014). “Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane,” Philosophical Studies 169 (1): 71–92.
Bentham, Jeremy. (1823/1948). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, New York: Macmillan.
Bergson, Henri. (1889/1910). Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris: F. Alcan; translated as Time and Free Will, Frank Lubecki Pogson, tr., London: Allen and Unwin.
Berman, Mitchell. (2008). “Punishment and Justification,” Ethics 18: 258–90.
Björnsson, Gunnar, and Pereboom, Derk. (2016). “Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will,” in The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Buckwalter, Wesley and Sytsma, Justin, eds., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 142–57.
Bobzien, Suzanne. (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bohm, David. (1952). “A Suggested Interpretation of Quantum Theory in Terms of “Hidden” Variables,” Parts 1 and 2, Physical Review 85: 166–93.
Brink, David. (2021). Fair Opportunity, Responsibility and Excuse, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, Joseph. (1997). “A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies 88: 319–30.
Capes, Justin. (2013). “Mitigating Soft Compatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87: 640–63.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham: Lexington Books.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2017). Public Health and Safety: The Social Determinants of Health and Criminal Behavior, Burnley, UK: Researchers Links Books.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2020). “Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment,” Neuroethics 13 (1): 13–28.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2021). Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chisholm, Roderick. (1964/1982). “Human Freedom and the Self,” The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in Free Will, Watson, Gary, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 24–35.
Chisholm, Roderick. (1976). Person and Object, La Salle: Open Court.
Clarke, Randolph. (1993). “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Noûs 27: 191–203.
Clarke, Randolph. (1996). “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” Philosophical Topics 24: 19–48.
Clarke, Randolph. (2003). Libertarian Theories of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, Randolph. (2005). “An Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 13–24.
Clarke, Randolph. (2019). “Free Will, Agent Causation, and ‘Disappearing Agents’,” Noûs 53 (1): 76–96.
Copp, David. (2008). “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” Analysis 68: 67–75.
Cyr, Taylor. (2020). “Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1): 57–73.
d’Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry. (1770). Système de la Nature, ou Des Loix du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral (System of Nature or the Laws of the Moral and Physical World) Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey.
DeCaro, Mario. (2021). “Machiavelli’s Lucretian View of Free Will,” in Lucretius, Poet and Philosopher: Background and Fortunes of the De Rerum Natura, Hardie, Philip R., Prosperi, Valentina and Zucca, Diego, eds., Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 201–18.
Deery, Oisín, and Nahmias, Eddy. (2017). “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies 174 (5): 255–76.
Rocca, Della, Michael. (1998). “Frankfurt, Fischer, and Flickers,” Noûs 32: 99–105.
Demetriou, Kristin. (2010). “The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 595–617.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). Elbow Room, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). Freedom Evolves, New York: Viking Press.
Dennett, Daniel C., and Caruso, Gregg D.. (2021). Just Deserts, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Descartes, René. (1639–40/1996). Meditations on First Philosophy, Cottingham, John, tr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Doris, John. (2015). “Doing without (Arguing about) Desert,” Philosophical Studies 172: 2625–34.
Dorr, Cian. (2016). “Against Counterfactual Miracles,” Philosophical Review 125: 241–86.
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2000). Free Will, a Philosophical Study, Boulder: Westview.
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2019). “Toward a Plausible Event-Causal Indeterminist Account of Free Will,” Synthèse 196: 127–44.
Everett, Hugh. (1957). “‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics,” Reviews of Modern Physics 29: 454–62.
Farrell, Daniel M. (1985). “The Justification of General Deterrence,” Philosophical Review 104: 367–94.
Feinberg, Joel. (1970). “Justice and Personal Desert,” in Feinberg, Joel, Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 55–94.
Feltz, Adam. (2013). “Pereboom and Premises: Asking the Right Questions in the Experimental Philosophy of Free Will,” Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1): 53–63.
Finch, Alicia, and Warfield, Ted. (1998). “The Mind Argument and Libertarianism,” Mind 107: 515–28.
Fischer, John Martin. (1982). “Responsibility and Control,” Journal of Philosophy 79: 24–40.
Fischer, John Martin. (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell.
Fischer, John Martin. (2004). “Responsibility and Manipulation,” The Journal of Ethics 8: 145–77.
Fischer, John Martin. (2016). “How Do Manipulation Arguments Work?” The Journal of Ethics 20: 47–67.
Fischer, John Martin, and Ravizza, Mark. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969). “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–39.
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20.
Franklin, Christopher. (2011). “Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Arguments,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2): 199–230.
Franklin, Christopher. (2018). A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press.
Ghirardi, Giancarlo, Rimini, Alberto, and Weber, Tullio. (1986). “Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and Macroscopic Systems,” Physical Review D 34: 470–91.
Ginet, Carl. (1962). “Can the Will be Caused?” The Philosophical Review 71: 49–55.
Ginet, Carl. (1966). “Might We Have No Choice?” in Freedom and Determinism, Lehrer, Keith, ed., New York: Random House, pp. 87–104.
Ginet, Carl. (1990). On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginet, Carl. (1997). “Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency,” The Journal of Ethics 1: 85–98.
Ginet, Carl. (2007). “An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent,” in Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy, Lumer, Christoph and Nannin, Sandro, eds., Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 243–56.
Goetz, Stewart. (2008). Freedom, Teleology, and Evil, London: Continuum.
Goldberg, Julie H., Lerner, Jennifer S., and Tetlock, Philip E.. (1999). “Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor,” European Journal of Social Psychology 29: 781–95.
Graham, Peter. (2011). “‘Ought’ and Ability,” Philosophical Review 120: 337–82.
Greene, Joshua. (2008). “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in Moral Psychology, vol. 3, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter P., ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 35–79.
Greene, Joshua, and Cohen, Jonathan D.. (2004). “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B-Biological Sciences 359: 1775–85.
Griffith, Meghan. (2010). “Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky,” American Philosophical Quarterly 47: 43–56.
Haas, Daniel. (2013). “In Defense of Hard-Line Replies to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophical Studies 163: 797–811.
Haji, Ishtiyaque. (1998). Moral Appraisability, New York: Oxford University Press.
Haji, Ishtiyaque. (2000). “Libertarianism and the Luck Objection,” The Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 329–37.
Haji, Ishtiyaque. (2002). Deontic Morality and Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hameroff, Stuart. (1998). “Quantum Computation in Brain Microtubules? The Penrose-Hameroff ‘Orch OR’ Model of Consciousness,” Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 356: 1869–96.
Harris, Sam. (2012). Free Will, New York: Free Press.
Hartman, Robert J. (2016). “Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 173 (10): 2845–65.
Healey, Richard. (2012). “Quantum Theory: A Pragmatist Approach,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4): 729–71.
Healey, Richard. (2017). The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hieronymi, Pamela. (2001). “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 529–55.
Hobbes, Thomas. (1654/1999). Of Liberty and Necessity, in Chappell, Vere, ed., Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Honderich, Ted. (1988). A Theory of Determinism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horst, Steven. (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hume, David. (1739/1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis Selby-Bigge, Amherst, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, David. (1748/2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Millican, Peter, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hunt, David P. (2000). “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action,” Philosophical Studies 97: 195–227.
Hunt, David P. (2005). “Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 126–45.
Jeppsson, Sofia. (2020). “The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophical Studies 177 (7): 1935–51.
Kane, Robert. (1985). Free Will and Values, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Kane, Robert. (1996). The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, Robert. (2007). “‘Libertarianism’ and ‘Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas’,” in John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 5–43, 166–83.
Kant, Immanuel. (1781/1787/1987). Critique of Pure Reason, Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen, trs., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. (1785/1981). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ellington, James, tr., Indianapolis: Hackett.
Kant, Immanuel. (1797/2017). The Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor, Mary, tr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kearns, Stephen. (2012). “Aborting the Zygote Argument,” Philosophical Studies 160: 379–89.
Kelly, Erin. (2009). “Criminal Justice without Retribution,” Journal of Philosophy 106: 440–56.
Khoury, Andrew. (2014). “Manipulation and Mitigation,” Philosophical Studies 168 (1): 283–94.
King, Matthew. (2013). “The Problem with Manipulation,” Ethics 124 (1): 65–83.
Kleiman, Mark. (2009). When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Laplace, Pierre-Simon. (1814/1995). A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Truscott, Frederick Wilson and Emory, Frederick Lincoln, trs., New York: Dover Books.
Latham, Noa. (2004). “Determinism, Randomness, and Value,” Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2): 153–67.
Lehrer, Keith. (1968). “‘Can’s without ‘If ’s,” Analysis 24: 159–60.
Leiter, Brian. (2007). “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” Philosophers’ Imprint 7: 1–15.
Lenman, James. (2006). “Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 117: 7–31.
Levy, Neil. (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David. (1981). “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” Theoria 47: 113–21.
Lewis, David. (1986). “Events,” in David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 241–69.
Lewis, Peter J. (2016). Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, New York: Oxford University Press.
Libet, Benjamin. (1985). “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529–66.
Locke, John. (1690/1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Nidditch, Peter H., ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lucretius. (50 BCE/1998). On the Nature of the Universe, Melville, Ronald, tr., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. (1987). Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Matheson, Benjamin. (2016). “In Defense of the Four-Case Argument,” Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1963–82.
McCann, Hugh. (1998). The Works of Agency, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
McKenna, Michael. (1997). “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy,” Journal of Social Philosophy 28: 71–85.
McKenna, Michael. (2000). “Assessing Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8: 89–114.
McKenna, Michael. (2005). “Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 163–80.
McKenna, Michael. (2008). “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 142–59.
McKenna, Michael. (2012). Conversation and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, Michael. (2014). “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-Liner Takes it on the Chin,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89: 467–84.
McKenna, Michael. (2019). “Basically Deserved Blame and Its Value,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15: 255–82.
McKenna, Michael, and Pereboom, Derk. (2016). Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction, New York: Routledge.
Mele, Alfred. (1996). “Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,” Philosophical Topics 24: 123–41.
Mele, Alfred. (2003). “Agents’ Abilities,” Noûs 37: 447–70.
Mele, Alfred. (2006). Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, Alfred. (2008). “Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Ethics 12: 263–86.
Mele, Alfred. (2009). Effective Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, Alfred. (2013). “Free Will and Neuroscience,” Philosophic Exchange 43: 1–17.
Mele, Alfred. (2017). Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
Milam, Per-Erik. (2016). “Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42: 102–22.
Moore, George Edward. (1912). Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, Michael. (1987). “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179–219.
Moore, Michael. (1998). Placing Blame, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morris, Herbert. (1968). “Persons and Punishment,” The Monist 52: 475–501.
Morris, Stephen. (2018). “The Implications of Rejecting Free Will: An Empirical Analysis,” Philosophical Psychology 31 (2): 299–321.
Morse, Stephen J. (2004). “Reasons, Results, and Criminal Responsibility,” University of Illinois Law Review 10 (2): 363–444.
Morse, Stephen J. (2013). “Common Criminal Law Compatibilism,” in Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility, Nicole A. Vincent, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–52.
Moya, Carlos. (2006). Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murray, Dylan, and Lombrozo, Tania. (2017). “Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility,” Cognitive Science 41 (3): 447–81.
Nadelhoffer, Thomas. (2011). “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism,” in Conscious Will and Responsibility, Nadel, Lynne and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, eds., Oxford: Press, Oxford University, pp. 173–88.
Nahmias, Eddy. (2011). “Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed., Kane, Robert, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 555–76.
Nahmias, Eddy. (2014). “Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences,” in Moral Psychology, vol. 4, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–26.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2008). “Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 497–515.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2011). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2019). “Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3): 425–38.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2022). “Relationships and Responsibility,” in The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Nelkin, Dana and Pereboom, Derk, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 542–65.
Nichols, Shaun. (2007). “After Compatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes,” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 405–28; reprinted in Nichols (2015), pp. 141–66.
Nichols, Shaun. (2015). Bound, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1888/1954). Twilight of the Idols, Kaufmann, Walter, tr., New York: Viking.
Nowell-Smith, Patrick. (1948). “Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Mind 57: 45–61.
O’Connor, Timothy. (1995). “Agent Causation,” in Agents, Causes, and Events, O’Connor, Timothy, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 170–200.
O’Connor, Timothy. (2000). Persons and Causes, New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Connor, Timothy. (2008). “Agent-Causal Power,” in Dispositions and Causes, Handfield, Toby, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–214.
Palmer, David. (2011). “Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases,” Philosophical Studies 153: 261–72.
Palmer, David. (2021). “Free Will and Control: A Noncausal Approach,” Synthèse, 98 (10): 10043–10062.
Penrose, Roger. (1989). The Emperor’s New Mind: Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Penrose, Roger. (1994). Shadows of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. (1995). “Determinism Al Dente,” Noûs 29: 21–45.
Pereboom, Derk. (2000). “Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories,” Philosophical Perspectives 14, pp. 119–37.
Pereboom, Derk. (2001). Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. (2004). “Is Our Conception of Agent Causation Incoherent?” Philosophical Topics 32, pp. 275–86.
Pereboom, Derk. (2008). “A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 160–70.
Pereboom, Derk. (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. (2017a). “Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 4, Shoemaker, David, ed., pp. 121–40.
Pereboom, Derk. (2017b). “Responsibility, Agency, and the Disappearing Agent Objection,” in Le Libre-Arbitre, Approches Contemporaines, Guillon, Jean-Baptiste, ed., Paris: Collège de France, pp. 1–18.
Pereboom, Derk. (2019). “Free Will Skepticism and Prevention of Crime,” in Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society, Caruso, Gregg, Shaw, Elizabeth, and Pereboom, Derk, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99–115.
Pereboom, Derk. (2020). “Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” Neuroethics 13: 87–97.
Pereboom, Derk. (2021). Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derk, Pereboom. (2022). “Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples,” in The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Nelkin, Dana and Pereboom, Derk, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 157–78.
Derk, Pereboom, and McKenna, Michael. (2022). “Manipulation Arguments,” in The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Nelkin, Dana and Pereboom, Derk, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 179–202.
Perry, John. (2004). “Compatibilist Options,” in Freedom and Determinism, Campbell, Joseph K., O’Rourke, Michael, and Shier, David, eds., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 231–54.
Priestley, Joseph. (1778/1965). A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, In a Correspondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley, London: Joseph Johnson, 1778, Part III; reprinted in Joseph Priestley, Priestley’s Writings on Philosophy, Science, and Politics, John Passmore, ed., New York: Collier.
Quinn, Warren. (1985). “The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 327–73.
Ragland, Clyde P. (2016). The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, New York: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John. (1955). “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64: 3–32.
Reid, Thomas. (1788/1983). Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, D. D., Hamilton, Sir William, ed., Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Rosen, Gideon. (2003). “Culpability and Ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 61–84.
Rosen, Gideon. (2004). “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18: 295–313.
Śāntideva. (700/1995). The Bodhicaryāvaātra, Crosby, Kate and Skilton, Andrew, trs., New York: Oxford University Press.
Sapolsky, Robert M. (2017). Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst, London: Penguin.
Sartorio, Carolina. (2016). Causation and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sartorio, Carolina. (2017). “Frankfurt-Style Examples,” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, 1st ed., Timpe, Kevin, Griffith, Meghan, and Levy, Neil, eds., London: Routledge, pp. 179–90.
Scanlon, Thomas M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, Thomas M. (2009). Moral Dimensions, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schlick, Moritz. (1939). “When is a Man Responsible?” in Schlick, Moritz, Problems of Ethics, Rynin, David, tr., New York: Prentice-Hall, pp. 143–56.
Schoeman, Ferdinand D. (1979). “On Incapacitating the Dangerous,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 27–35.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. (1818/1961). The World as Will and Idea (later translated as The World as Will and Representation), Richard B. Haldane and John Kemp, trs., Garden City: Doubleday.
Sekatskaya, Maria. (2019). “Double Defence against Multiple-Case Manipulation Arguments,” Philosophia 47 (4): 1283–95.
Shabo, Seth. (2010). “Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80: 349–83.
Shabo, Seth. (2012). “Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson’s Interpersonal Defense of Compatibilism,” Philosophical Review 121: 95–124.
Shabo, Seth. (2022). “Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes,” in The Oxford Handbook on Moral Responsibility, Nelkin, Dana and Pereboom, Derk, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 566–89.
Shaw, Elizabeth. (2019). “Justice without Moral Responsibility?” Journal of Information Ethics 28 (1): 95–114.
Shoemaker, David. (2011). “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 121: 602–32.
Shoemaker, David. (2015). Responsibility from the Margins, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slattery, ‘ Trick. (2014). Breaking the Free Will Illusion for the Betterment of Humankind, Salem, IL: Working Matter Publishing.
Slote, Michael. (1982). “Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem,” Journal of Philosophy 79: 5–24.
Slote, Michael. (1990). “Ethics without Free Will,” Social Theory and Practice 16: 369–83.
Smart, John Jamieson Carswell. (1961). “Free Will, Praise, and Blame,” Mind 70: 291–306.
Smilansky, Saul. (2000). Free Will and Illusion, New York: Oxford University Press.
Smilansky, Saul. (2011). “Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio,” Law and Philosophy 30: 353–67.
Smith, Angela. (2012). ”Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account,” Ethics 122 (3): 575–89.
Smith, Angela. (2013). “Moral Blame and Moral Protest,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, Justin Coates, D. and Tognazzini, Neal A., eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–48.
Sommers, Tamler. (2007). “The Objective Attitude,” Philosophical Quarterly 57: 321–41.
Sommers, Tamler. (2012). Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Soon, Chun Siong, Brass, Marcel, Heinze, Hans-Jochen, and Haynes, John-Dylan. (2008). “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–45.
Spinoza, Benedictus de. (1677/1985). “Ethics,” in The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, Curley, Edwin, ed. and tr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 408–620.
Sripada, Chandra. (2012). “What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 63–93.
Sripada, Chandra. (2016). “Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 173: 1203–32.
Strawson, Galen. (1986). Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, Galen. (1994). “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
Strawson, Peter F. (1962/2003). “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 187–211; reprinted in Free Will, 2nd ed., Gary Watson, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72–93.
Stump, Eleonore. (1990). “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, Beaty, Michael, ed., Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 254–85.
Stump, Eleonore. (1996). “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Jordan, Jeff and Snyder, Daniel Howard, eds., Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 73–88.
Tadros, Victor. (2016). Wrongs and Crimes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tadros, Victor. (2017). “Doing without Desert,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 11: 605–16.
Talbert, Matthew. (2012). “Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest,” Journal of Ethics 16: 89–101.
Taylor, Richard. (1966). Action and Purpose, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Taylor, Richard. (1974). Metaphysics, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Telech, Daniel. (2020). “Praise as Moral Address,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7, Shoemaker, David, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 154–81.
Tierney, Hannah. (2013). “A Maneuver around the Modified Manipulation Argument,” Philosophical Studies 165: 753–63.
Tierney, Hannah. (2014). “Taking It Head-On: How to Best Handle the Modified Manipulation Argument,” Journal of Value Inquiry 48: 663–75.
Tierney, Hannah, and Glick, David. (2020). “Desperately Seeking Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 953–70.
Todd, Patrick. (2011). “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” Philosophical Studies 152: 127–33.
Todd, Patrick. (2012). “Manipulation and Moral Standing: An Argument for Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Imprint 12: 1–18.
Todd, Patrick. (2013). “Defending (a Modified Version of the) Zygote Argument,” Philosophical Studies 164: 189–203.
Tognazzini, Neal A. (2014). “The Structure of a Manipulation Argument,” Ethics 124 (2): 358–69.
Usher, Marius. (2020). “Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2): 302–24.
Peter, van Inwagen. (1975). “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,” Philosophical Studies 27: 185–99.
Peter, van Inwagen. (1983). An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vargas, Manuel. (2013). Building Better Beings, New York: Oxford University Press.
Vargas, Manuel. (2015). “Desert, Responsibility, and Justification: A Reply to Doris, McGeer, and Robinson,” Philosophical Studies 172: 2659–78.
Vicens, Leigh, and Kittle, Simon. (2019). God and Human Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vihvelin, Kadri. (1988). “The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Studies 53: 227–44.
Vihvelin, Kadri. (2017). Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2004). “Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 42: 547–64.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2008). “Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 46: 121–44.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2009a). “Free Will and Reasonable Doubt,” American Philosophical Quarterly 46: 131–40.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2009b). “Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39: 489–511.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2012). “Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously,” Philosophical Quarterly 62: 833–52.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. (2013). “Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism,” Philosophical Studies 162: 143–63.
Wallace, R. Jay. (1994). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Waller, Bruce. (1990). Freedom without Responsibility, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Waller, Bruce. (2011). Against Moral Responsibility, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Waller, Bruce. (2015). The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Watson, Gary. (1975). “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–20.
Watson, Gary. (1987). “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 256–86.
Watson, Gary. (1996). “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Philosophical Topics 24: 227–48.
Wedgwood, Ralph. (2007). The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wegner, Daniel. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Whittle, Ann. (2010). “Dispositional Abilities,” Philosophers’ Imprint 10: 1–23.
Widerker, David. (1987). “On an Argument for Incompatibilism,” Analysis 47: 37–41.
Widerker, David. (1995). “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 104: 247–61.
Widerker, David. (2000). “Frankfurt’s Attack on Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look,” Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181–201.
Wolf, Susan. (1980). “Asymmetrical Freedom,” Journal of Philosophy 77: 151–66.
Wolf, Susan. (1990). Freedom within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, Linda. (1991). The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, New York: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, Linda. (2000). “Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?” Philosophical Perspectives 14: 231–48.
