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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2025

Andrés Perea
Andrés Perea
Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
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From Decision Theory to Game Theory
Reasoning about the Decisions of Others
 , pp. 532 - 538
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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  • References
  • Andrés Perea, Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
  • Book: From Decision Theory to Game Theory
  • Online publication: 17 June 2025
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  • References
  • Andrés Perea, Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
  • Book: From Decision Theory to Game Theory
  • Online publication: 17 June 2025
Available formats
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  • References
  • Andrés Perea, Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
  • Book: From Decision Theory to Game Theory
  • Online publication: 17 June 2025
Available formats
×