Book contents
- Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research
- Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Theory and Future Directions in Alliance Research
- 1 Frontiers of Alliance Research
- 2 Understanding Contracting Behavior
- 3 Rationality in Theoretical Modeling of Collaborative Ventures
- 4 The Transaction Cost Theory of Equity Joint Ventures
- 5 Using Alliances to Test Core Theories of Strategic and International Management
- Part II Alliances in the Context of Rapid Technological Change and Disruptions
- Part III Microfoundational Processes and Coordination between Partners
- Part IV Alliance Management Capability
- Part V Alliance Scope
- Part VI Alliance Portfolios and Multilateral Alliances
- Part VII Multimarket Competition and Multinational Alliances
- Part VIII Innovation Networks and Alliances
- Part IX Fostering Trust and the Impact of Culture
- Part X The Evolution, Survival or Termination of Alliances
- Part XI Public–Private Partnerships
- Index
- References
3 - Rationality in Theoretical Modeling of Collaborative Ventures
from Part I - Theory and Future Directions in Alliance Research
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2019
Book contents
- Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research
- Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Theory and Future Directions in Alliance Research
- 1 Frontiers of Alliance Research
- 2 Understanding Contracting Behavior
- 3 Rationality in Theoretical Modeling of Collaborative Ventures
- 4 The Transaction Cost Theory of Equity Joint Ventures
- 5 Using Alliances to Test Core Theories of Strategic and International Management
- Part II Alliances in the Context of Rapid Technological Change and Disruptions
- Part III Microfoundational Processes and Coordination between Partners
- Part IV Alliance Management Capability
- Part V Alliance Scope
- Part VI Alliance Portfolios and Multilateral Alliances
- Part VII Multimarket Competition and Multinational Alliances
- Part VIII Innovation Networks and Alliances
- Part IX Fostering Trust and the Impact of Culture
- Part X The Evolution, Survival or Termination of Alliances
- Part XI Public–Private Partnerships
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Frontiers of Strategic Alliance ResearchNegotiating, Structuring and Governing Partnerships, pp. 55 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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