The research for this book began with a recognition that in certain international issue areas cooperation is continuous and durable, and in others it is infrequent and fragile. We recognized, in particular, that there are many aspects of international economic relations where there are relatively stable international regimes. We decided to analyze the development of several international economic regimes and the reasons why the regulatory arrangements have been strong or weak for different aspects of an issue area. We chose the regimes for international shipping, air transport, telecommunications, and postal services because, as infrastructure industries, they are central to the operation of the international economy.

In seeking to understand why states have mutual interests in cooperation in certain areas and not others, we consulted literature in economics and political science. A great deal of the economics and political science literature on regulation assumes the existence of a government and is therefore of limited utility. However, writings from neoclassical economics theory concerning the benefits that flow from the regulation of “market failures” proved to offer considerable insights into why international regimes are created. The theoretical literature from international relations concerning mutual interests in cooperation tends to be very general and does not offer the insights into the likelihood of particular types of international cooperation that we hoped to find.