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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      14 January 2010
      17 February 2003
      ISBN:
      9780511615849
      9780521818537
      9780521522212
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.563kg, 342 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.452kg, 342 Pages
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    Book description

    Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.

    Reviews

    ‘It’s been a long time since the appearance of so important a book on worker participation and the governance of enterprises. Dow lays out the states of our knowledge and of our ignorance clearly and readably, inviting us to join him in thinking about what might be the next steps forward. No better introduction to the subject matter is available.’

    Louis Putterman - Brown University

    ‘In market economies, most firms are owned and managed by those who supply financial capital, not by the people who work in them. Why? This is a topic that sometimes generates more heat than light. However, in this dispassionate analysis, Greg Dow perceptively examines the rich and diverse literature on this topic and comes up with important insights. This book will immediately become the standard reference on worker ownership and management and is thoroughly recommended for both specialist and non-specialist alike.’

    John Pencavel - Stanford University

    ‘What difference does it make when workers rather than capital owners control firms, electing managers, and owning (for better or worse) the fruits of their labor? Greg Dow’s Governing the Firm provides the economic analysis and empirical facts based on the experience production cooperatives around the world to answer this question. It’s the best book on the subject.’

    Samuel Bowles - University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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    Contents

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