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6 - Explanatory Strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2010

Gregory K. Dow
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
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Summary

The Symmetry Principle

This chapter has two broad objectives. First, I develop a pair of heuristic tools, the symmetry and replication principles, which are helpful in probing hypotheses about LMFs. The rest of the chapter surveys strategies that could be used to explain the facts about LMFs. These include theoretical frameworks that rely primarily on efficiency concepts (transaction-cost economics, contract theory) and others that assume optimizing behavior but leave more room for inefficiency (adverse selection, repeated games). I also consider two approaches not derived from microeconomic theory, those invoking history and culture. My goal is not to evaluate the empirical merits of any theory, but to present a theoretical menu from which choices can later be made.

A useful source of intellectual discipline in generating explanations for the rarity of workers' control runs as follows. If there were competitive markets for all relevant goods and services, firms would not exist in a meaningful sense because all production activities could be coordinated through market contracting rather than authority. In this environment, each agent would maximize the profit obtained by transactions in input and output markets because each would want to have the maximum possible income available for consumption purposes. There would be no debate about control rights or the objectives of firms.

Type
Chapter
Information
Governing the Firm
Workers' Control in Theory and Practice
, pp. 117 - 141
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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  • Explanatory Strategies
  • Gregory K. Dow, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Governing the Firm
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615849.008
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  • Explanatory Strategies
  • Gregory K. Dow, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Governing the Firm
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615849.008
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Explanatory Strategies
  • Gregory K. Dow, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Governing the Firm
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615849.008
Available formats
×