Imputability

Morality is concerned with the subjective, but subjectivity is actual only insofar as it makes itself objective. The consequences of what I do are not appended accidentally to my moral subjectivity. They are its actuality, and it is from them that I must learn the meaning of what I am as a moral subject. It is equally true that from a moral standpoint I am interested in my actions and their consequences only insofar as they express my subjectivity. Hence from the moral standpoint it is important to decide for which external events my subjective will can be held accountable.

Anything I do changes the world in some way, or at least contributes to such changes. Hegel says that I “am responsible for” (Schuld bin an) any event in which my doing (Tun) is causally involved (PR § 115); but not everything for which I am responsible (in this causal sense) may be “imputed” (zugerechnet, imputiert) to me, treated as an expression of my subjective will. Hegel distinguishes my “deed” (Tat) from my “action” (Handlung). Action consists only of that part or aspect of what I effect that lies in my conscious knowledge. This part or aspect of my deed Hegel calls my “purpose” (Vorsatz) (PR § 117). The extent of the consequences of my action lying within my purpose depends on my “representation” (Vorstellung) of the circumstances and of the likely results of what I did.