“Language is the house of being.” This is undoubtedly one of Heidegger’s most memorable and most often repeated slogans. (To avoid cumbersome and unnecessarily complex sentences, I will, for the remainder of this chapter, refer to this as simply “the slogan.”) Heidegger himself uses some variant of the slogan in at least a dozen different essays or lecture courses between 1937 and 1966. Since then, it has been repeated in hundreds of different articles and books on Heidegger’s work. The reason for its popularity, I suspect, is that it seems to encapsulate, in one concise statement, Heidegger’s answer to one of the central problems in his later work – the problem of the relationship between being and language. It also seems to launch Heidegger into the orbit of the linguistic turn in twentieth century philosophy, and thus promises to set up an interesting and profitable comparison between Heidegger and analytic philosophy. “Language is the house of being” sounds like a distant but clearly recognizable German cousin to other claims like “the limits of language . . . mean the limits of my world,” or “to be is to be the value of a variable,” or more recently, McDowell’s somewhat less punchy claim that “human beings mature into being at home in the space of reasons or, what comes to the same thing, living their lives in the world; we can make sense of that by noting that the language into which a human being is first initiated stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world” (Mind and World, p. 125). I think bringing Heidegger’s slogan into conversation with these other related claims is a worthwhile project – albeit a project that will have to wait for another occasion. This is because we ought to see if we cannot clarify what Heidegger’s slogan means before we presume to compare it to other recent positions on the relationship between language and being.