Presumably the French state started the war in Algeria from an advantageous position in the marketplace of ideas. Algeria was a part of sovereign France, and therefore the war could be convincingly portrayed as involving core national security interests. Furthermore, the war could be framed in the larger context of the Cold War, and thus be presented as a part of the effort to defend the free world from “the Communist threat.” Finally, FLN savagery provided a moral justification of the war and the resort to “extreme” measures. For the last two reasons, France could also present the war not only as a matter of national security, but also as embodying a struggle between the forces of light against those of darkness.

At the same time, however, the Algerian situation also involved some complexities that made the marketing of the war less easy and the state less enthusiastic to engage in such an endeavor in the marketplace of ideas. First, although legally part of sovereign France, Algeria nevertheless remained somewhat remote from continental consciousness. Second, the war in Algeria had to be fought in the shadow of a long and disastrous involvement in Indochina (which eventually was ill-received by the French) and thus not likely to create much enthusiasm or willingness to sacrifice among residents of continental France. Moreover, the temptation to play down the situation in Algeria was further strengthened by the fact that initial FLN activity was somewhat sporadic and therefore seemed to require only a limited investment.