Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-ws8qp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-26T22:33:42.521Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2009

Richard Foley
Affiliation:
New York University
Get access

Summary

Issues of intellectual trust, both in ourselves and in others, are of fundamental importance for how we conduct our intellectual lives, but in general these issues have not received the attention they deserve from epistemologists, in large part because of the influence of classical foundationalists, whose aim was to develop an epistemology that would provide guarantees that our beliefs are generally accurate. Within such an epistemology, there is no need for, and indeed no room for, a basic trust in one's intellectual faculties and the opinions they generate. However, the classical foundationalist project has failed. There are no non-question-begging assurances that our faculties and opinions are largely reliable. As a result, all of our intellectual projects require a significant leap of intellectual faith in ourselves, the need for which cannot be eliminated by further argumentation or inquiry.

With the fall of classical foundationalism, the way was cleared for a greater appreciation of this point, but various trends in contemporary epistemology continue to mask the importance of intellectual self-trust. Some epistemologists take for granted that the theory of natural selection is capable of providing us with assurances that our opinions are largely reliable. Others try to provide assurances of reliability by arguing that skeptical hypotheses are necessarily self-refuting.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Conclusion
  • Richard Foley, New York University
  • Book: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
  • Online publication: 30 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Conclusion
  • Richard Foley, New York University
  • Book: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
  • Online publication: 30 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Richard Foley, New York University
  • Book: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
  • Online publication: 30 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923.007
Available formats
×