Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2026
I identify and propose to resolve a contradiction in Sellars’s ontology. On the one hand, as a scientific realist, he is committed to the thesis that scientific descriptions and explanations have priority over nonscientific descriptions and explanations. Insofar as science itself is descriptive and eschews all normative concepts, it would seem that there is no room for any normatively governed phenomena in Sellars’s scientific realism. On the other hand, Sellars is committed to the existence of at least one major kind of normatively governed phenomenon: persons. I have argued that persons have a distinct kind of reality that I call practical reality. In this chapter I explain why Sellars’s own approach to ontology is compatible with the idea of practical reality, what kinds of things have practical reality, and why persons have practical reality.
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