Nancy's dauntingly commodious exposition of “sense” is bound to his view of the multifarious nature of human experience. Offering a rousing critique of, on the one hand, any transcendental thinking that implies a source of sense “beyond” the world and, on the other, any immanential thinking that mimetically conceives of such a source within the world, he insists that all we can say of sense is that it is the world itself, or, alternatively, is constitutive of the very structure of the world. It is singular, material by virtue of its corporeal reticulations and coextensive with both thinking and world. If there is a singular sense “of” and “in” the world that is accessible to discourse, then by extension it is necessary to explore the multiplicities by which this sense is available at all to our finite thinking (a singular thought of a singular being, double genitive). However, the rigorous precept that this finite thinking has no access to the unthinkable “beyond” places ineradicable constraints on any exploration of sense. In this palimpsest notion of immanence, there is no inside-outside distinction at play, but only the very facticity of a world whose sense always collapses into an open, reticulated immanence without any recourse to transcendent (or transcendental) sources of meaning. Hence his critique of immanence is intended to approach its factical conditions, not to offer a panegyric for “the Other”. For Nancy, transcendence is merely what Western thought has customarily referred to as the untransgressible “beyond” of the horizon of immanence.