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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
INTRODUCTION
In Speech Acts (1969), John Searle lists a number of general hypotheses concerning illocutionary acts, the first of which relates those acts to the activity of expression:
Whenever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act counts as an expression of that psychological state.
(1969: 65, italics in original)Searle goes on to tell us that this is the case whether or not the speech act is sincere, so that even if I do not believe what I assert, that assertion is still an expression of belief. Further,
to assert, affirm, or state that p counts as an expression of belief (that p). To request, ask, order, entreat, enjoin, pray, or command (that A be done) counts as an expression of a wish or desire (that A be done). To promise, vow, threaten, or pledge (that A) counts as an expression of intention (to do A). To thank, welcome or congratulate counts as an expression of gratitude, pleasure (at H's arrival), or pleasure (at H's good fortune).
In his published discussions of speech acts in subsequent years, Searle, together with his collaborator Vanderveken, take the notion of expression as an unexplained explainer with respect to the properties of speech acts. That by itself is not objectionable. However, this notion of expression raises questions that a deeper insight into the possibilities and limits of communication would hope to answer.
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