“INTUITIONISM” VS. “MORAL EMPIRICISM”

Just what role should be assigned to moral judgments or moral intuitions in the process of selecting among or justifying moral theories is a matter of ancient controversy. Egoists and utilitarians, for example, have always had to do battle with those who urge a tribunal in which a moral theory must match commonly held moral judgments. Proponents of such tribunals have been hard pressed, in turn, to provide credentials for these judgments. This old debate has taken on a modern form in the contrast between two recent proposals for solving the problem of theory acceptance or justification in ethics, the method of wide reflective equilibrium, which derives from Rawls, and the moral empiricism advocated by Brandt. My intention is to contrast these methods to see what lessons we may draw about the role of moral judgments in theory acceptance.

It is fair to construe these two recent proposals as major alternatives. Indeed, Brandt elaborates his own view in response to the “intuitionism” he thinks undermines the method of wide reflective equilibrium and, specifically, Rawls' use of the method in constructing his contractarian approach to the problem of choosing among competing moral conceptions. I shall concentrate on Brandt's methodological proposals, both because of their intrinsic interest and because I have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of wide reflective equilibrium in detail elsewhere (1979a, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b). I will, however, offer a brief sketch of the method of wide reflective equilibrium so that some points of contrast with Brandt's approach will be clear.