In this chapter, the author addresses how Plato’s treatment of self-knowledge in the late dialogues ought to impact our views on the placement and authenticity of the Alcibiades I. While this dialogue identifies self-knowledge as knowledge of soul, a dialogue such as the Philebus seems far more concerned with self-ignorance. Indeed, its threefold division of self-ignorance actually seems to render problematic the exclusive equivalence of self-knowledge with knowledge of soul. The author argues that there is nothing in the Alcibiades I that would suggest a theoretical affinity between it and the hiatus-avoiding dialogues such as the Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws, and the Clitophon (if it is indeed by Plato). Generally, the later dialogues signal a fundamental shift in Plato’s thinking on self-knowledge. Whereas earlier dialogues contained a positive doctrine of self-knowledge – which entails a deep awareness of the core of human being that is the ground of virtuous life – the later dialogues give self-knowledge a predominantly negative valence; i.e., it is a condition of freedom from false convictions and their accompanying, mistaken belief that one knows.