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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2017

Steven L. Reynolds
Steven L. Reynolds
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Arizona State University
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Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony , pp. 207 - 213
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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  • References
  • Steven L. Reynolds, Arizona State University
  • Book: Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
  • Online publication: 05 July 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108181815.011
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  • References
  • Steven L. Reynolds, Arizona State University
  • Book: Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
  • Online publication: 05 July 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108181815.011
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  • References
  • Steven L. Reynolds, Arizona State University
  • Book: Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
  • Online publication: 05 July 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108181815.011
Available formats
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