This book develops and defends a novel ‘knowledge-first’ theory of intentional action that places knowledge at its core. The project is motivated by problems with the dominant ‘decompositional picture’ of action. The decompositional view treats actions as composed of two separate components: external bodily movements and internal mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs). Such views, it is argued, fail to accommodate a central feature of intentional action: namely, the fact that intentional actions are characteristically actions that are controlled, or guided, by their agents. As a result, the decompositional picture threatens to radically alienate us from our own bodily actions. Building on ideas from Elizabeth Anscombe, this book argues for a non-decompositional account of intentional action that places a certain kind of knowledge – practical knowledge – at its centre. Along the way, a number of related topics are discussed, such as the nature of agential control, skill, and an ontology of actions as hylomorhically structured particulars.