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from Part I - General introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
Introduction
On a particular day in June 2006, The Times featured two stories that are indicative of the way in which regulators might turn to technological tools. The first story, running over two pages, announces a proposed network of new generation synchronised speed cameras; if a car is driven too fast through a restricted speed zone, the cameras will pick this up, the car number plate will be identified, the information is centrally processed and penalty notices issued within minutes of the offence. The second story, taking up a whole page, reports that a 58-year-old architect, having been interviewed but not charged in connection with a complaint about theft, and having had a DNA sample routinely taken, was found to have a DNA match with samples taken from crime scenes where young girls had been indecently assaulted many years earlier. In both cases, these reports are implicit endorsements, indeed a celebration, of the relevant technologies.
There is more to this than mere newspaper talk. A few months later, a report for the (UK) Information Commissioner predicted that, as the technologies of surveillance become increasingly sophisticated, less obtrusive and embedded, citizens will not always be aware that they are being monitored and regulated. Thus:
[The] continuous software-sorting of people and their life chances in cities is organised through myriad electronic and physical ‘passage points’ or ‘choke points’, negotiated through a widening number of code words, pass words, PIN numbers, user names, access controls, electronic cards or biometric scans. Some are highly visible and negotiated willingly (a PIN credit card purchase or an airport passport control). Others are more covert (the sorting of internet or call centre traffic). On still other occasions, the passage point is clear (a CCTV camera on a street or a speed camera on a motorway), but it is impossible to know in practice if one’s face or car number plate has actually been scanned.
More generally, the ‘combination of CCTV, biometrics, databases and tracking technologies can be seen as part of a much broader exploration … of the use of interconnected “smart” systems to track movements and behaviours of millions of people in both time and space’.
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