THE LIBERTARIAN THESIS

In the previous chapter I characterised the libertarian defence of the free market as one in which freedom and voluntariness have pride of place. I now turn to an examination of that defence. My aim in this chapter is to show how the libertarian contention that a free market society is one where liberty and justice are realised because all (supposed) limitations of freedom derive from specific voluntary undertakings, is vitiated by indefensible definitions of freedom, harm and voluntariness. More precisely, I here do three main things: first, I argue that the libertarian justification of the unbridled market is underpinned by a rights-definition of voluntariness, alongside the more familiar rights-definition of freedom; second, I examine the notion of rights-defined voluntariness, and argue that it should be rejected; and finally, I show how two of Nozick's central contentions in the defence of the unbridled market – namely, that taxation is on a par with forced labour, and that workers are not forced to sell their labour – rest on the rights-definition of voluntariness and that their force is therefore undermined.

In undertaking this critical examination of the libertarian argument for the free market it is helpful to start by identifying the main steps in which it unfolds, and briefly discussing how two challenges that may be raised against that argument are avoided by libertarians by using moralised definitions of harm and freedom.