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11 - Computer Systems

Moral Entities but Not Moral Agents

from PART III - ISSUES CONCERNING MACHINE ETHICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

By
Deborah G. Johnson
Edited by
Michael Anderson  and
Susan Leigh Anderson
Michael Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Hartford, Connecticut
Susan Leigh Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
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Summary

Introduction

In this paper i will argue that computer systems are moral entities but not, alone, moral agents. In making this argument I will navigate through a complex set of issues much debated by scholars of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computer ethics. My claim is that those who argue for the moral agency (or potential moral agency) of computers are right in recognizing the moral importance of computers, but they go wrong in viewing computer systems as independent, autonomous moral agents. Computer systems have meaning and significance only in relation to human beings; they are components in socio-technical systems. What computer systems are and what they do is intertwined with the social practices and systems of meaning of human beings. Those who argue for the moral agency (or potential moral agency) of computer systems also go wrong insofar as they overemphasize the distinctiveness of computers. Computer systems are distinctive, but they are a distinctive form of technology and have a good deal in common with other types of technology.

On the other hand, those who claim that computer systems are not (and can never be) moral agents also go wrong when they claim that computer systems are outside the domain of morality. To suppose that morality applies only to the human beings who use computer systems is a mistake.

Type
Chapter
Information
Machine Ethics , pp. 168 - 183
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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