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10 - Philosophical Concerns with Machine Ethics

from PART III - ISSUES CONCERNING MACHINE ETHICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

Michael Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Hartford, Connecticut
Susan Leigh Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
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Summary

The challenges facing those working on machine ethics can be divided into two main categories: philosophical concerns about the feasibility of computing ethics and challenges from the AI perspective. In the first category, we need to ask first whether ethics is the sort of thing that can be computed. One well-known ethical theory that supports an affirmative answer to this question is Act Utilitarianism. According to this teleological theory (a theory that maintains that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined entirely by the consequences of the actions), the right act is the one, of all the actions open to the agent, which is likely to result in the greatest net good consequences, taking all those affected by the action equally into account. Essentially, as Jeremy Bentham (1781) long ago pointed out, the theory involves performing “moral arithmetic.”

Of course, before doing the arithmetic, one needs to know what counts as “good” and “bad” consequences. The most popular version of Act Utilitarianism – Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism – would have us consider the pleasure and displeasure that those affected by each possible action are likely to receive. As Bentham pointed out, we would probably need some sort of scale to account for such things as the intensity and duration of the pleasure or displeasure that each individual affected is likely to receive. This is information that a human being would need to have, as well, in order to follow the theory.

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Machine Ethics , pp. 162 - 167
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

Anderson, M., Anderson, S., and Armen, C. (2005), “Toward Machine Ethics: Implementing Two Action-Based Ethical Theories,” in Machine Ethics: Papers from the AAAI Fall Symposium. Technical Report FS- 05–06, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park, CA.Google Scholar
Anderson, M., Anderson, S., and Armen, C. (2006), “An Approach to Computing Ethics,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 21, No. 4.Google Scholar
Anderson, S. L. (1995), “Being Morally Responsible for an Action versus Acting Responsibly or Irresponsibly,” Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bentham, J. (1781), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Dietrich, E. (2006), “After the Humans are Gone,” NA-CAP 2006 Keynote Address, RPI, Troy, New York.
Gazzaniga, M. (2006), The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, Harper Perennial, New York.Google Scholar
Mappes, T. A., and DeGrazia, D. (2001), Biomedical Ethics, 5th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.Google Scholar
Pojman, L. J. (1996), “The Case for Moral Objectivism,” in Do the Right Thing: A Philosophical Dialogue on the Moral and Social Issues of Our Time, ed. by Beckwith, F. J., Jones and Bartlett, New York.Google Scholar
Ross, W.D, (1930), The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

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