Having argued that the substantive approach to the problem of false self-assessment should be favored over subjectivist rationalism, I now turn to the issue of the evaluation of others. Here the central issue is what, if anything, justifies our moral criticism of others. My aim is to show that the substantive approach to this question should be favored over inter-subjectivist rationalism. I shall argue that it is a mistake to think that moral criticism of others must be justified by a rationalistic argument revealing the presuppositions of rational argumentation. Instead, we should seek to support the criticism by substantive reasons. In §1 of this chapter, I shall lay out the basic argument for the superiority of the substantive approach. The rest of the chapter consists of elaborations and answers to objections. In the next chapter, then, I turn to the special problem of cross-cultural criticism of others.

PUTTING CRUELTY BEFORE PRAGMATIC CONTRADICTIONS

The issue in this chapter is not whether rationalism and the substantive approach yield different moral judgments, but rather which justification of those judgments should be favored. I shall thus consider an uncontroversial judgment – the condemnation of torture – and compare the respective justifications. My goal is not to argue that the rationalist's conclusions do not follow from the premises (that was the aim of chapter 9).