How are we to justify cross-cultural moral criticism? According to an objection raised in the last chapter, the substantive approach is unable to justify such criticism, whereas rationalism is. Contrary to the substantive approach, rationalism justifies cross-cultural criticism by neutral criteria. They are neutral in the sense that they are not in dispute between the critics and the criticized. Substantive justifications often draw on criteria which are in dispute between the two sides. Now – so the objection goes – cross-cultural criticism cannot be shown to be justified unless it is based on neutral criteria. Therefore, the substantive approach is unable to justify such criticism.

In this chapter, I shall argue that, even with respect to the justification of cross-cultural moral criticism, the substantive approach is superior to rationalism. It should be emphasized that this does not amount to showing that moral criticism of other cultures is ever justified. To do so, I would have to embark upon a discussion of relativism about reason and morality which would take me beyond the scope of this study. All I want to show is that if cross-cultural criticism is ever justified, it is a mistake to demand that it must be justified by rationalistic reasons rather than only by substantive reasons.

In §1, I shall argue that there are good reasons to reject the demand for neutral criteria. In my view, this argument suffices to show that the substantive approach should be favored over rationalism even in the case of cross-cultural criticism.