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6 - Inferring manipulative intent

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2009

Jeffrey C. Williams
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
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Summary

The Hunts' involvement with the silver market in 1979 and early 1980 was incessant. They hardly spent a day without taking delivery on some futures contract, without adjusting the composition of their positions through rollovers into other delivery months, without negotiating some exchange for physicals, without communicating with CBOT and Comex officials. At the time and in the subsequent legal proceedings, the Hunts were credited with an overarching rationale for their actions. From that quite natural supposition arose an inductive logic: some of the Hunts' actions could betray the purpose of all their actions, whether the purpose be investment, as the Hunts maintained, or manipulation, as the plaintiff charged. The intention behind the Hunts' actions was paramount because under the relevant statutes as they have come to be interpreted, no wrongdoing ensues without the specific intent to manipulate.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement characterized a number of the Hunts' particular transactions as “manipulative acts.” In like manner, Minpeco compiled a list of “uneconomic acts” committed by the Hunts, which supposedly were unprofitable by themselves but furthered a manipulative scheme as a whole. According to the defense, many of these actions had innocent interpretations or were economically rational. It instead pointed to other actions consistent with the objectives of long-term investment as indicating the Hunts' motives. Despite disagreement over the purposes of particular acts, all the lawyers and economists concerned accepted that detailed analysis of specific transactions could reveal intent.

Type
Chapter
Information
Manipulation on Trial
Economic Analysis and the Hunt Silver Case
, pp. 161 - 189
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

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