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  • Print publication year: 2013
  • Online publication date: December 2013

5 - Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

from Part I - Theoretical Fundamentals
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Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
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