Book contents
- Mental Causation
- Mental Causation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Theories of the Mind and Theories of Causation
- Chapter 2 Mental Causation by Counterfactual Dependence
- Chapter 3 Mental Causation by Causal Modelling
- Chapter 4 The Exclusion Problem
- Chapter 5 Conclusion
- Book part
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 December 2019
Book contents
- Mental Causation
- Mental Causation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Theories of the Mind and Theories of Causation
- Chapter 2 Mental Causation by Counterfactual Dependence
- Chapter 3 Mental Causation by Causal Modelling
- Chapter 4 The Exclusion Problem
- Chapter 5 Conclusion
- Book part
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Information
- Mental CausationA Counterfactual Theory, pp. 208 - 220Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
- Creative Commons
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/
References
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